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Petitioner, a Mexican alien who entered the United States in 1918
and has remained except for brief occasional visits to Mexico, was a
member of the Communist Party from 1944 to 1946. He was ordered
deported under the Internal Security Act of 1950 (McCarran Act),'
which made alien membership in the Communist Party a specific
ground for deportation. Certiorari was granted to review a judgment
of the court of appeals2 affirming a denial of a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Act and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to sustain his deportation, since at the time of
his membership he was unaware of the violent advocacy of the Party.
Held, (7-2), 3 judgment affirmed. Neither support nor even demon-
strated knowledge of the Communist Party's advocacy of violence
and force is a prerequisite to deportation under the Act, which is con-
stitutional since it is neither a violation of due process nor an ex post
facto law.4 Galvan v. Press, 74 Sup. Ct. 737 (1954), rehearing denied,
75 Sup. Ct. 17 (1954).
There is no constitutional limit to the power of Congress to expel
aliens.5 The magnitude of this power is founded on the concept that
if the power were less, the nation would be to that extent subject to
the control of another power.6 The alien, whose entry is permissive
and whose presence is tolerative, has neither the right to enter nor
1. 64 STAT. 1006 (1950), re-enacted without material change in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, 66 STAT. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (1953). Section
22 of the original Act provides that the Attorney General shall take into
custody and deport any alien "who was at the time of entering the United
States or has been at any time thereafter . . . a member of any one of the
classes of aliens enumerated in section 1 (2) of this Act.. . ." Subparagraph (C)
of § 1 (2) lists "Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Communist
Party of the United States .... "
2. 201 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1953).
3. Opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter; dissents by Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Douglas.
4. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9. It has been held repeatedly that deportation is not"punishment" for purposes of ex post facto clause. See Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590 (1952); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); Buga-
jewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). See ROTTScHAEFER, CONSTrruTIONAL
LAW §§ 317-18 (1939); 1 Am. JuR., Aliens § 72 (1936).
5. Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1926)1; Skeffington v. Katzeff,
277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1922); Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920)
(reversed on other grounds); 3 C.J.S., Aliens § 33 (1936). This power is vested
in Congress exclusively by virtue of U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
6. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889); 1 Am.
JuR., Aliens § 68 (1936).
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the right to remain.7 He is, in both respects, the recipient of a mere
privilege conferred by Congresss-a privilege which may be with-
drawn at will.9 The Court in the instant case concluded that the classi-
fication of the Communist Party as such an organization that an alien's
membership therein, in and of itself warrants his deportation, is not
so baseless as to be violative of due process.10 The real basis for up-
holding the constitutionality of the Act, however, was that the plenary
power of Congress over the formulation of policies regarding the ex-
clusion and deportation of aliens is not qualified by the concept of
substantive due process." A distinction must be drawn between cases
involving the constitutional rights afforded an alien while he enjoys
the hospitality of the United States and those involving the Govern-
ment's right to withdraw its acquiescence to his presence and deport
him. In the first instance, aliens have been held to be entitled to cer-
tain substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 The alien
facing deportation, however, enjoys no such rights since only his per-
mission to remain is rescinded.
The petitioner, in contending that he was not a "member" of the
Communist Party under the provisions of the Act, presented a problem
of statutory interpretation with which the Court has previously been
confronted. Under the Immigration Act of 1918 it was held that proof
of knowledge of the aims and objectives of certain organizations was
inessential in deporting aliens, Congress having specified that mem-
bership alone was sufficient.13 The Harry Bridges Case14 in 1945 em-
phasized that actual and literal membership in the Communist Party
was essential to deportation under the Alien Registration Act of 1940.
It was there held that mere cooperation and support of the Party would
7. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); 1 Am. Jun., Aliens
§ 69 (1936).
8. Latva v. Nicholls, 106 F. Supp. 658 (D. Mass. 1952).
9. Chung Yim v. United States, 78 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1935). Laws pertinent
to the deportation of aliens have been enacted since the Alien and Sedition
Laws of 1798. 1 STAT. 570. Political offenders were first listed as subjects of
deportation in 1910. 36 STAT. 264. This classification of deportable aliens was
enlarged in 1917. 39 STAT. 889. Deportation of aliens because of membership
in prescribed subversive organizations was introduced in 1918. 40 STAT. 1012.
Congress became dissatisfied with the 1918 law when in 1939 the Supreme Court
held that it applied only to aliens who were members when proceedings were
instituted against them, Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939), and the next
year passed the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 670 (1940), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 137 (1953), which made deportation mandatory for all aliens who at any time
had been members of the described organizations. This Act continued in effect
until the enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
10. Instant Case at 742.
11. Id. at 743; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Note, Constitu-
tional Law, 66 HARv. L. R v. 99, 104-7 (1952).
12. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
13. Kjar v. Doak, 61 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1932); Greco v. Haft, 63 F.2d 863 (9th
Cir. 1933).
14. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
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not suffice. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,15 which affirmed the consti-
tutionality of the 1940 Act, at least one of the deported aliens was
deemed ignorant of the violent propensities of the Communist Party at
the time of membership. A recent district court case,16 which inter-
preted the membership requirement of the statute in the instant case
literally, said any other interpretation "would be making, not inter2
preting law," since such action would open for aliens exits "with
dimensions imprecisely defined and impractical of administration."
Thus, the Court's literal interpretation of the statute is in harmony
with previous interpretations of similar statutes and is indicative of the
attitude of the courts toward the necessity of personal belief in and
advocacy of the Communist Party principles by the alien subject to
deportation.
In supporting its interpretation of the statute, the Court looked to
that section of the statute which provides that aliens who innocently
become members of certain prescribed organizations will be exempted
from deportation. No such allowance is made for "innocent" members
of the Communist Party. A 1951 amendment to the Act 17 provides
other exceptions. Congress, by implication at least, has stated that
when exceptions to the law are to be made, it will provide them.
Senator McCarran, the sponsor of the Act, stated in Congressional
debate prior to the passage of the Act that the word "member" under
the Act would have the same meaning as it had been given by the
courts since 1918.18 In relying on this expression of legislative intent,
the Court cited cases prior to 1950 in which aliens were held to be
susceptible to deportation even though unaware of the aims of the
groups with which they were affilidted. The Court concluded that the
mem)5ership requirement of the 1950 Act is satisfied when an alien
under his own free will joins the Communist Party, aware he is joining
the organization as such.
Congress is moving in the direction of the "absolute"'19 power, in
dealing with aliens, that upon occasion has been attributed to it. The
Supreme Court, by a literal interpretation of the membership require-
ment for deportation and by again failing to interfere with retroactive
deportation provisions, continues to allow Congress to purge certain
aliens from the nation. The Congressional enactments involved are
not examples of arbitrary withdrawal of the privileges extended
15. 342 U.S. 580 (1952), 66 HARV. L. REEv. 105 (1953), T'ehearing denied, 343
U.S. 936 (1952).
16. Latva v. Nicholls, 106 F. Supp. 658, 663 (D. Mass. 1952).
17. 65 STAT. 28, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (1952). Aliens are excepted when they join
(1) when they were children, (2) by operation of law, (3) to obtain the
necessities of life.
18. 97 CONG. REC. 2368-74 (1951).
19. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); 1 Am.-JuR.,
Aliens § 69 (1936).
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aliens, but rather are demonstrations of a Congressional conviction
that the presence of certain aliens may be detrimental to the nation's
welfare. Should the feeling of insecurity become more acute, it is
reasonable to assume that Congressional measures will become more
drastic and that the Court will continue to sustain such legislative
action.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-DUTY OF
NON-RESIDENT VENDOR TO COLLECT USE TAX
Appellant, a Delaware Corporation, was held liable for delinquent
use taxes which, under the terms of a Maryland statute,1 it was re-
quired to collect from Maryland residents making retail purchases at
appellant's Delaware store. Some of the taxed sales were cash-and-
carry; others, amounting to some $8,000 over a four-year period, in-
volved delivery in Maryland by private truck or common carrier.
Appellant was neither qualified to do business in Maryland nor had
it salesmen, solicitors, or agents there. No orders were taken by mail
or telephone. Appellant advertised with only Delaware newspapers
and radio stations; but, although no ads were directed specially to
them, some reached Maryland residents. Circulars were periodically
mailed to all former customers, including those in Maryland. The
vendor appealed on the ground that under the given facts Maryland
could not constitutionally require it to serve as tax collector. Held,
(5-4) reversed. The facts fail to disclose a connection between the
taxing state and the foreign corporation sufficient to meet the re-
quirements of substantive due process. Miller Brothers Co. v. Mary-
land, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
The use tax is levied upon the privilege of using, storing, or con-
suming tangible personal property within the taxing state, and has
generally been enacted to discourage avoidance of the sales tax.
2
There is no doubt that the taxing state can collect the use tax from
its citizens who use the goods in the taxing state.3 An equally axio-
matic postulate is that the taxing state can require an in-state vendor
to collect, at the time of the sale, the tax due from the resident vendee.
4
The instant Maryland statute, however, seeks to make an out-of-state
vendor serve as a use tax collector. Such a collection procedure has
been upheld where: (a) the vendor had distributing agencies in the
taxing state,5 though the goods taxed were ordered by mail from the
1. MD. AN . CODE GEN. LAws art. 81 § 371 (1951).
2. Comment, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 281 (1944).
3. Instant case at 345.
4. Pierce Oil Corporation v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924).
5. Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
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vendor's out-of-state branches,6 and though the foreign corporation
was not qualified to do local business in the taxing state;7 (b) foreign
vendors, having no agencies or offices in the taxing state, did business
through soliciting salesmen there.8
The out-of-state corporation subjects itself to the power of the tax-
ing state so as to satisfy due process requirements when the corpora-
tion has sufficient local contacts to make the exercise of jurisdiction
reasonable and inoffensive to traditional notions of fair play and-
substantial justice.9 In Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson" the Supreme..
Court first upheld the constitutionality of requiring collection of the
use tax by the out-of-state vendor. The local contacts there present
were subsidiary service stations maintained by the out-of-state ven-
dor within the taxing state. Similarly, in Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co.," and in Nelson v. Montgomery Ward,'2 the foreign corporate
vendor was authorized to do business and operated retail stores in
Iowa. Iowa residents ordered goods directly from the vendor's out-of-
state mail-order houses and the goods were delivered directly to the
customer. Though the transactions in question were entirely uncon-
nected with the vendor's intra-state activities, the intra-state activity
was held to furnish the "contact" necessary to sustain the imposition
of the duty to collect the use tax. The rationale of the Monamotor,
Sears, and Montgomery-Ward cases is that the vendor's services in
collecting taxes on out-of-state sales of property to be used in the
taxing state may reasonably be "... exacted as a price of enjoying the
full benefits flowing from its [the vendor's] aggregate ... [in-state]
business." 18
In General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission,14 the out-of-state
vendor had no office within the taxing state, but the Court, neverthe-
less, found the necessary contact in the activity of salesmen of the
out-of-state vendor who actively solicited orders in the taxing state.
The instant case differs from General Trading primarily in that here
no active solicitation was present. This difference affords a basis for
a rule which, though not stated by the Court, will explain and recon-
cile the two cases: The factor of active solicitation present in General
Trading is different in kind from the mere delivery in the instant
case. Regardless of the number of deliveries made by appellant-
6. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
7. Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
8. General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
9. "... the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.... the reason-
ableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts' Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
10. 292 U.S. 86 (1934).
11. 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
12. 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
13. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373, 375 (1941).
14. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
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vendor there would still have been no type of contact on which to
base a requirement that the vendor collect the tax. Apparently the
sales would have been made in the instant case regardless of the
factors of delivery and indirect solicitation; whereas, in General
Trading there would have been no sale without the solicitation. The
rule then evolves that in the absence of a branch within the taxing
state, the requisite connection will be found only in activity within
the taxing state which is an inducing cause of the out-of-state sale.
The as yet unenunciated rationale of the rule deducible from General
Trading and the instant case appears essentially similar to that drawn
from Monamotor, Sears-Roebuck, and Montgomery-Ward-the out-
of-state vendor who derives benefits from his activities within the
taxing state may reasonably be required to collect a use tax in return
therefor.
The Court in the instant case uses language which seems to indicate
that since the taxing state cannot levy a sales tax on the out-of-state
vendor, it cannot make this vendor serve as use-tax collector.r0 If
the language were meant to convey this idea, it is in conflict with all
precedent. An out-of-state vendor is not subject to a sales tax imposed
by the domiciliary state of the vendee for the same reason that the
tax could not be collected from the vendee himself:'0 A sales tax on
an out-of-state sale contravenes the Commerce Clause. An out-of-state
vendor has repeatedly been required to collect a use tax due from a
resident vendee where there was sufficient contact to satisfy the re-
quirements of substantive due process.'1 If the Court did not intend to
question the basic constitutionality of the foreign-vendor collection
device, it is indeed unfortunate that it has muddied the water in a yet
not fully charted stream.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-TAXABLE
SITUS OF PROPERTY OF INTERSTATE AIR CARRIER
Plaintiff, an interstate air carrier, sought a declaratory judgment
that a Nebraska ad valorem personal property tax' on its flight equip-
ment was invalid. It alleged immunity under the due process and'
15. ". . . it was recently settled that Maryland could not have reached this
Delaware vendor with a sales tax on these sales. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322
U.S. 327. Can she then make the same Delaware sales a basis for imposing
on the vendor liability for use taxes due from her own inhabitants? It would
be a strange law that would make appellant more vulnerable to liability for
another's tax than to a tax on itself." Instant case at 345.
16. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
17. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); Felt & Tarrant Manu-
facturing Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson,
292 U.S. 86 (1934). : . ,
1. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-1244 et seq. (1943).
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'commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution on the grounds that
its flight equipment'had not obtained' a taxable situs in Nebraska
and that Federal regulation of air navigation precluded such taxation.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska dismissed the petition 2 and plaintiff
appealed. Held, affirmed. % Whether the property had acquired a tax-
able situs does not raise a commerce clause question. When an airline
makes eighteen scheduled stops per day in a state from which it
derives benefit and protection, it has sufficient nexus with that state
to sustain an apportioned ad valorem tax3 on its aircraft, over due
process clause objection, even though none of the aircraft is continu-
ously within the state.4 Braniff Airways, Inc. v.,Nebraska, 347 U.S.
590 (1954), rehearing denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 18 (1954).
A state may impose a local property tax on instrumentalities of
interstate commerce which have obtained a taxable situs within the
state.5 Thus, property taxation of interstate instrumentalities such
as ships,6 telegraph lines,7 railroads,s and aircraft" has been sustained.
The state's power to impose such a tax rests on the theory that its
lawmaking power extends to all property within its borders, 0 and
that one receiving the benefit and protection of such laws may reason-
ably be subjected to a tax on its personal.property located within the
state." Generally the taxpayer has relied on the due process and
commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution to attack the imposition
2. Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc. v. Nebraska, 157 Neb. 425, 59 N.W.2d 746
(1953).
3. The apportionment formula considered the following elements as they
'were represented within the state compared to their total value in interstate
operations: (1) aircraft arrivals and departures (2) revenue tons (3) origi-
nating revenue. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1245 (1943). The reasonableness of the
formula was not questioned.
4. Plaintiff did not ultimately rely on the commerce clause and the couit
observed that exercise of the commerce power by Congress to regulate air
carriers did not impair state action, finding precedents in its decisions up-
holding the exercise of federal power over navigable streams. See Oklahoma
ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941).
5. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); see Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 206-7 (1905); HARTMAN,
STATE TAxATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 14-15 (1953).
6. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949). But cf.
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); St. Louis v. The Ferry Co.,
11 Wall. 423 (U.S. 1870).
7. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 125 U.S. 530
(1888).
8. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); cf. Nash-
ville, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); New York ex rel.
New York Central & H.R. R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906); see Johnson Oil
Refining Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158, 163 (1953).
9. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); cf. Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 153 A.L.R. 245 (1944). Note, 57
HAnv. L. REV. 1097 (1944).
10. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22 (1891).
11. See Union Refrigerato Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 202 (1905);




of such taxes.12 The problem frequently involves a determination of
whether an instrumentality has obtained a situs within the taxing
state, which was the question in the instant case.
The Court, in invalidating a tax on instrumentalities of interstate
transportation and communication, does not always make it clear
whether, in a given case, the tax contravenes the commerce clause
or the due process clause, or both. 3 State taxation of the property of
an interstate organism, based on an unfair apportionment of that
property among the interested states, violates the commerce clause
by placing an undue tax burden on interstate commerce.14 The exer-
cise of legislative jurisdiction over subject matter insufficiently con-
nected with the taxing state to make reasonable the operation of the
state's power thereon is violative of due process.' 5 Thus, the due
process clause requires that the taxing power exerted "bear[s] fiscal
relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state."'16
A property tax on instrumentalities of transportation and communi-
cation is often invalidated on both due process and commerce clause
grounds where it does not fairly apportion the property between the
taxing state and other states in which it is used.' 7 Both the due process
and commerce clause objections are obviated however, by use of a fair
formula which equitably apportions the property among the states.
18
12. See Barrett, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce-"Direct Burdens,"
"Multiple Burdens," or What Have You?, 4 VAND. L. REV. 496 (1951).
13. Hays v. The Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596 (U.S. 1854); Standard Oil
Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 385 (1952); see Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949); HARTmAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 15, 17; Barrett,'
supra note 13, at 496, 498.
14. During most of our constitutional history, including the present, the
predominant doctrinal declaration of the Court has been that interstate com-
merce cannot be taxed at all by the states even though the tax is not dis-
criminatory against such interstate commerce. Spector Motor Service, Inc.
v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Ozark
Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
419 (U.S. 1827). See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 8 (1933). Nor can
interstate commerce be taxed even though the same amount is laid on local
business. Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). See HART-
MAN, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 28-33, 41-46. There have been interludes, how-
ever, when the Court seemed committed to the realistic view that interstate
commerce should bear its fair share of the local tax burden so long as the
tax on interstate commerce would not subject interstate business to multiple
tax burdens not borne by local business. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Rev., 303 U.S. 250 (1938); see Western Union v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216
U.S. 1, 38-46 (1910); cf. Interstate Oil Pipeline Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662
(1949); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948). Where inter-
state commerce is subjected to the risk of a heavier tax burden than local
business, the tax is struck down. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,
305 U.S. 434 (1939); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938)
15. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905); see
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (referred to as taxable
event, jurisdiction to tax,' business situs, and extraterritoriality); cf. Johnson
Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
16. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
17. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158
(1933); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).
18. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949) (ratio of
intrastate ship mileage to total interstate mileage); Pullman's Palace Car Co.
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It is not constitutionally improper to require interstate commerce to
pay its own way, although this consideration has seldom been given
much weight by the Court.' 9
The Court, in resolving this problem of property taxation of inter-
state instrumentalities, generally has applied the doctrine expressed
in the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam (subject to the law of
owner's domicile) to intangible personal property 20 and that in lex
situs (subject to law where it is kept and used) to tangible personal
property.21 In the early leading case of Pullman's Palace Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania22 the Court applied the lex situs doctrine and upheld a
formula which properly apportioned a property tax to the benefits and
protection received by the vehicles operating interstate where the
taxing state was not the owner's domicile. The lex situs doctrine has
also found application in the taxation of ships, 23 railroads, 24 and air-
craft.25 A further development occurred with the decision in New
York Central H.R. R.R. v. Miller26 that where a portion of the taxed
vehicles was out of the domiciliary state on such random excursions
that they did not become taxable elsewhere, then the domiciliary
state did not lose its power to tax the entire group of vehicles. North-
west Airlines v. Minnesota27 reaffirmed the doctrine advanced in the
Miller case holding that all of the taxpayer's aircraft were taxable
by the domiciliary state. In the latter case, however, no showing
was made that the taxed vehicles had acquired a taxable situs else-
where, while in Northwest Airlines it was stipulated or found as a
fact that Northwest had regularly scheduled operations in eight states
v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891) (percentage of capital stock measured by
ratio of intrastate railway mileage to total interstate mileage); cf. Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 125 U.S. 530 (1888) (per-
centage of capital stock measured by ratio of intrastate telegraph-line mileage
to total interstate-line mileage. It is recognized that property thus taxed may be
valued as a "unit" which considers its augmented value as derived from its
use in interstate operations. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra;
HARTMAx, op. cit. supra note 5, at 92.
19. See Western Livestock v. Bureau of Rev., 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938);
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919); New
Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338, 351 (1930)
(dissenting opinion).
20. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 206 (1905);
Note, 139 A.L.R. 1463 (1942).
21. Originally the doctrine, mobilia sequuntur personam was applied to
tangibles. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 20, at
206; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22 (1891).
22. 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
23. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949). But cf.
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
24. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158
(1933); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); cf.
New York ex rel. New York Central & H.R. R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
25. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); cf. Northwest
Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
26. 202 U.S. 584 (1906); accord, Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S.
63 (1911).
27. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
1954]
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which ostensibly would have had power to tax. Therefore, doubt was
raised by Northwest Airlines as to what showing would be necessary
to relieve a taxpayer from taxability of his entire fleet of interstate
vehicles by his domiciliary state. In Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co. 28 the Court showed that it had not deviated from the "appor-
tionment doctrine." That case allowed a domiciliary state to tax
barges operating interstate where a fair formula was employed to
apportion the property to the taxing state. In Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck29 the Court refused on due process grounds, to allow the domi-
ciliary state to tax the full value of taxpayer's fleet where it was shown
that a portion thereof was subject to taxation on an apportionment
basis by other states. In the Peck case the Court distinguished on the
ground that no showing had been made that Northwest's aircraft
were taxable elsewhere and thus subject to multiple tax burdens not
borne by local business. As thus explained, Northwest Airlines is in
line with prior doctrine. It only remained for the principal case to
apply the apportionment doctrine used in taxing ships and railroads
to airlines.
Henceforth, interstate airlines will apparently be subject to prop-
erty taxation in any state in which they have scheduled operations.0
However, to avoid taxation on the total value of their property in their
domiciliary state, they will have to show that a portion thereof has at-
tained a taxable situs in another state.31 The question of the taxability
of non-scheduled carriers by a non-domiciliary state has not yet arisen.
On theory no reason appears why they should be exempt. As a matter
of convenience, however, they will probably remain taxable only by
the state of their domicile.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-INFANTS-RIGHT TO
DISAFFIRM SEPARATION AGREEMENT
Defendant, a minor, and her husband entered into a separation
agreement, providing for their immediate separation and a waiver
by each of all rights against the other arising out of the marital rela-
tionship, including defendant's right of support. When the husband
died shortly afterwards, defendant sought a wife's share in the estate
28. 336 U.S. 169 (1949). This case placed water and land transportation on
the same footing. Compare Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63
(1911) (water transportation taxable only at the domicile of the owner),
with Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891) (railroads
taxable on an apportionment basis in all states in which they operate.)
29. 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
30. Cf. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949); Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905). But cf. Standard
Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
31. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); New York ex rel
New York Central & H.R. R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
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in contravention of the agreement. Plaintiffs, parents and sole sur-
viving heirs of the deceased, sought to have the agreement declared
valid and to enjoin payment by the administrator of any part of the
estate to the defendant. On appeal from a directed verdict for the
defendant, held, reversed. As the defendant, though an infant, was
lawfully married, she falls within the purview of a statute authoriz-
ing separation agreements between husband and wife and cannot
now disaffirm. Burlovic v. Farmer, 115 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio App. 1953).
Formerly all separation agreements' between husband and wife
were considered void as contrary to public policy.2 Today, however.
both in England and in this country, the separation agreement is
upheld,3 at least when the parties comply with certain formal' and
substantive requirements of the various jurisdictions. In the United
States only those agreements which contemplate an immediate or
existing separation are upheld.5 Agreements which look forward
to a separation in the future are void,0 as are those which promote or
facilitate divorce.- The agreement must be in all respects fair and
reasonable, particularly with regard to the wife and her right to sup-
port,8 and must be free of fraud and duress.9 Although there is a
considerable difference of judicial opinion,10 many courts require that
1. For a list of books, articles, notes and annotations on separation agree-
ments in general, see 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 470 (1932). For the
suggested form and provisions of separation agreements, see LINDEY, SEP-
ARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS 35 (Rev. ed. 1953) (con-
tains also a list of tax considerations); MAcKAY, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND Di-
VORCE SIMPLIFIED 60 (1946); WINNET AND GIBsox, FAMILY LAW 57 (1952). An
excellent review of separation agreements with cases cited may be found in
1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 13.05 et seq. (2d ed. 1945).
2. PECK, THE LAW OF PERSONS AND OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 93 (3d ed. 1930);
TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 238 (3d ed. 1921).
3. Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 148 S.W.2d 3 (1941) (leading
case in Tenn.); Rex v. Mead, 1 Burr. 541, 97 Eng. Rep. 440 (K.B. 1758) (first
case upholding agreement); LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-
NUPTIAL CONTRACTS 45 (Rev. ed. 1953) (citing cases from almost every juris-
diction). For a history of the subject and a review of the cases, see Foote v.
Nickerson, 70 N.H. 496, 48 Atl. 1088 (1901). See also, 17 AM. JUR., Divorce
and Separation § 723 (1938) (citing cases and annotations); 2 VERNIER, AMER-
ICAN FAMILY LAWS 469 (1932).
4. For formal requisites of the various jurisdictions, see 17 Am. JUR., Divorce
and Separation § 730 (1938).
5. 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 13.17 (2d ed. 1945) (citing cases).
6. Stevralia v. Stevralia, 182 Misc. 1050, 48 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1944); 1
NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 13.05 (2d ed. 1945).
7. Dodd v. Dodd, 278 Ky. 662, 129 S.W.2d 166 (1939); 1 NELSON, DIVORCE
AND ANNurMENT § 13.22 (2d ed. 1945) (citing cases).
8. WINNET AND GIBsox, FAMILY LAWS 58 (1952). In determining what is
fair, courts turn to tests used in awarding alimony. Id. at 58 (listing various
considerations).
9. Alderson v. Alderson, 247 Ky. 12, 56 S.W.2d 534 (1933); 17 Am. JuR.,
Divorce and Separation § 724 (1938) (citing cases and annotations); 1 NELSON,
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 13.21 (2d ed. 1945).
10. See Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 408, 74 S.E. 327 (1912). The case




there be some substantial motivating cause for the separation." In
the United States the agreement is enforced only as to its provisions
concerning property rights;12 in England, however, the agreement
to live apart is also upheld.13
At least ten states have statutes specifically relating to sepa-
ration agreements. 14 All ten are substantially similar to the Ohio
statute involved in the instant case, stating merely, in general
terms, that separation agreements will be upheld. A statute, no
more explicit in its terms than this, must be construed in the light
of the common law surrounding its subject matter, 5 and hence,
would not seem to abrogate any of the rules set forth above. It is
submitted, therefore, that the defendant in the instant case, who was
provided no support and who received no consideration 0 for the
release of her rights other than the mutual release of the rights, if
any, of the husband, should have legitimate grounds for attacking the
agreement regardless of her infancy. The fact that she was an infant
aggravates the unfairness of the agreement if nothing else.
The rule that the contracts of an infant are valid, void, or voidable
as they are beneficial or detrimental to his interests,"7 has given way
to the more modern view that with certain specific exceptions the
contracts of an infant are voidable only. 8 The exceptions embrace
instances in which the infant is bound, not to his contract, but by
law, 9 through the operation of statutes20 and principles of unjust
enrichment,2' where public policy demands performance of all those
11. Baum v. Baum, 109 Wis. 47, 85 N.W. 122 (1901); 17 AM. JUR., Divorce
and Separation § 725 (1938) (citing cases and annotations).
12. Foote v. Nickerson, 70 N.H. 496, 48 At. 1088 (1901); TIFFANY, PERSONS
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 241 (3d ed. 1921); PECK, THE LAW OF PERSONS AND OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 283 (3d ed. 1930).
13. Besant v. Wood, 12 Ch. D. 605 (1879) (first case where rule recognized);
Kennedy v. Kennedy, [1907] P. 49; TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
239 (3d ed. 1921); PECK, THE LAW OF PERSONS AND OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
282 (3d ed. 1930) (citing cases and annotations).
14. L NDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS 43 (Rev.
ed. 1953); 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 138 (1932) (setting forth the
various statutes).
15. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 3 (3d ed. Horack, 1943) (citing
cases).
16. Consideration is requisite to the validity of the agreement. Wolff v.
Wolff, 134 N.J. Eq. 8, 34 A.2d 150 (Ch. 1943); 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNUL-
MENT § 13.20 (2d ed. 1945) (citing cases and treatises). Ordinarily the wife's
release of her right to support is sufficient. Ibid.
17. Swafford v. Ferguson, 71 Tenn. 292 (1879); 27 AM. JuR., Infants § 311
(1940) (citing cases).
18. State v. Hodge, 129 W. Va. 820, 42 S.E.2d 23 (1947); 1 WILLISTON AND
THOMPSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 226 (Rev. ed. 1936); 27 AM. JUR., Infants §
12 (1940) (citing cases and annotations). "Voidable" as used in this context,
has been generally held to mean "valid until avoided." 1 WILLISTON AND
THOMPSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 231 (Rev. ed. 1936).
19. 1 WILLISTON AND THOMPSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 228 (Rev. ed. 1936).
See also in this regard, 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 731 (1953).
20. 27 AM. JuR., Infants § 14 (1940) (setting forth specific examples with
cases and annotations cited).
21. 27 id. § 15.
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who enter such a relationship regardless of considerations of age.
Thus there can be said to be no strictly contractual obligations which
an infant may not timely disaffirm. If, then, the infant in the instant
case is to be bound by a statute making no specific reference to infants,
it should only be because the statute is interpreted as expressing a
policy against the right of disaffirmance, which overrides policy
considerations to the contrary behind the general rule. The statute
is capable of no such interpretation. If anything, it would seem that
policy would more strongly favor the right of disaffirmance in this
situation than in any other. It must be remembered that whereas
marriage does not remove the civil disabilities,22 it does emancipate
the person,23 freeing the child from parental control and destrdying
the correlative right of parental support. A child of tender years and
experience who is denied the right to disaffirm a separation agree-
ment (particularly as in the instant case where no support was pro-
vided) may thus become a legal orphan and hence a charge of society.
Reasoning not nearly so compelling is responsible for the general rule.
The paucity of cases dealing with the precise point is understandable
in view of the fact that the right of disaffirmance is probably seldom
questioned in such a situation. Only three cases were found,24 none
of which involved statutes similar to that in the instant case. All
held, with a minimum of reasoning, that a separation agreement was
voidable at the infant's election. There are numerous cases dealing
with infants' disaffirmance of ante-nuptial marriage settlements which,
though distinguishable from the instant case, are today unanimous
in upholding the right to disafflrm, 25 at least in the absence of a statute
expressly to the contrary.28
The only reason profferred by the court for the holding in the
instant case is that the terms "husband" and "wife" used in the
statute embrace infants. There is, concededly, authority for the
proposition that if the words of a statute, not expressly excluding
infants, are sufficiently broad to include them, they will be bound.
2 7
Such a rule, however, cannot prevail in the face of a showing of a
legislative intent to exclude, as manifest in the general purpose and
subject matter of the statute, as well as in other parts of the law.
28
22. Wharen v. Funk, 152 Pa. Super. 133, 31 A.2d 450 (1943); 43 C.J.S.,
Infants § 29 (1945) (citing cases).
23. Bonnette v. Flournoy, 9 La. App. 467, 119 So. 736 (1929); 43 C.J.S.,
Infants § 29 (1945).
24. Walker v. Walker, 209 Ga. 490, 74 S.E.2d 66 (1953); Sellers v. Sellers,
160 Ga. 516, 128 S.E. 659 (1925); Drummond v. Drummond, 171 N.Y. Supp.
477 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
25. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 107 Va. 112, 57 S.E. 577 (1907), 12 L.R.A. (N.s.)
1184 (1908); 26 Am. JuR., Husband and Wife § 276 (1940) (citing cases and
annotations).
26. 26 Am. JuR., Husband and Wife § 276 (1940).
27. 27 AM. Jura., Infants § 14 (1940).




In view of what has been said regarding policy and existing law, it is
felt that a finding of such a legislative intent was mandatory in the
instant case and that the wife was entitled to disaffirm.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RES ADJUDICATA-FAILURE TO
CROSSCLAIM IN SEPARATE MAINTENANCE SUIT
AS BAR TO SUBSEQUENT DIVORCE
A wife obtained an award of separate maintenance on grounds of
abandonment. Later her husband brought suit for divorce in another
county of the same state. The wife sought a writ of prohibition on
the ground that the prior decree for separate maintenance deprived
any other court of jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Held, writ denied.
As it was not necessary to allege grounds for divorce to obtain sep-
arate maintenance, the award of separate maintenance did not bar the
divorce action. The mere fact that the husband did not seek a divorce
by cross petition in the separate maintenance case does not deprive
him of his right to seek such relief in a separate proceeding. Hill v.
Rowles, 264 S.W.2d 638 (Ark. 1954).
It is well established that a decree of separate maintenance is en-
tirely separate and distinct from a decree of divorce." At common
law, a husband generally had a duty to support his wife, even though
they might live separate and apart.2 Since there was no remedy at
common law to compel the husband to support his wife, equity devel-
oped the suit for separate maintenance. 3 Although equity jurisdiction
of this action has been considered inherent in most states, 4 some have
enacted statutes expressly conferring such jurisdiction.
In the early days, separate maintenance was referred to as alimony.
1. Wood v. Wood, 54 Ark. 172, 15 S.W. 459 (1891); see Shirey v. Shirey, 87
Ark. 175, 112 S.W. 369, 372 (1908); Cohen, Suit for Separate Maintenance In-
dependent of Divorce, 5 VA. L. REG. (w.s.) 417 (1919).
2. Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265 (1869); Milliron v. Milliron, 9 S.D. 181, 68
N.W. 286, 62 Am. St. Rep. 863 (1896) (by implication); see Kientz v. Kientz,
104 Ark. 381, 149 S.W. 86, 89 (1912); In re .Popejoy, 26 Colo. 32, 55 Pac. 1083,
1084 (1899); Robinson, Alimony without Divorce, 2 VA. L. REV. 134 (1914).
3. Purcell v. Purcell, 14 Va. (4 H. & M.) 507 (1810); cf. Corley v. Corley, 67
Tenn. 7 (1874); see Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205, 73 S.E. 716, 717, 38 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 950, 953, [1913D] Anm. Cas. 1129, 1130 (1912).
4. Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265 (1869); Milliron v. Milliron, 9 S.D. 181,
68 N.W. 286, 62 Am. St. Rep. 863 (1896); Almond v. Almond, 25 Va. (4 Rand.)
662 (1826); Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205, 73 S.E. 716, 38 L.R.A. (N.s.) 950,
[1913D] Ann. Cas. 1129 (1912); Cureton v. Cureton, 117 Tenn. 103, 96 S.W. 608
(1906); cf. State v. Superior Court, 85 Wash. 72, 147 Pac. 436 (1915); MADDEN,
DoMESTic RE ATIONs § 99 (1931); Cohen, supra note 1, at 417; Robinson, supra
note 2, at 134.
5. See Cureton v. Cureton, supra note 4; MADDEN, DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 99
(1931).
6. See Wood v. Wood, 54 Ark. 172, 15 S.W. 459 (1891) (alimony defined as
allowance which husband might be compelled to pay to wife for her mainte-
nance when she was divorced or living apart from him). See also 17 Am. Jun.,
Divorce § 496; Cohen, supra note 1, at 417.
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Later a distinction was made, and alimony came to be considered as
an adjunct of divorce, while separate maintenance was designed to
provide the wife with the necessities of life; without affecting the
marriage ties7 Thus, the purpose of the separation decree is to adjust
marital difficulties with a view to maintaining the possibility of a
reconciliation.8 It follows that since a separate maintenance decree
is distinct from divorce, a suit for separate maintenance may be
maintained apart from any divorce action,9 and the wife in such case
need not set forth facts sufficient to obtain a divorce.' 0 For this rea-
son, a finding in favor of the wife for separate maintenance is not
necessarily a showing that the husband lacks grounds for divorce, or
that the wife actually has such grounds."
A separate maintenance decree is res adjudicata in a subsequent
divorce action by either spouse only as to those matters which were
actually litigated, or which necessarily should have been included
and disposed of by the action.12 Even though some matters might
have been put in issue in the former suit, if they were, in fact, not
litigated, they are not concluded.'3
Thus, a separate maintenance decree will not bar a subsequent
action for absolute divorce, unless the allegations of the second action
were adjudicated between the parties in the original suit.' 4 The
decree is not a bar to a suit for divorce for acts occurring after the
separation decree,' 5 nor is it a bar to a divorce suit for acts occurring
prior to the separate maintenance decree if they were not alleged by
7. Cf. Laird v. Laird, 201 Ark. 483, 145 S.W.2d 27 (1940); see Butts v. Butts,
152 Ark. 399, 238 S.W. 600, 601 (1922); Wood v. Wood, 54 Ark. 172, 15 S.W. 459,
460 (1891); Simonton v. Simonton, 40 Idaho 751, 236 Pac. 863, 865 (1925), 42
A.L.R. 1363 (1926); Note, 31 ORE. L. REv. 62 (1951).
8. 44 HARV. L. REv. 996 (1931).
9. Wood v. Wood, 54 Ark. 172, 15 S.W. 459 (1891); Galland v. Galland, 38
Cal. 265 (1869); In re Popejoy, 26 Colo. 32, 55 Pac. 1083 (1899); State v.
Superior Court, 85 Wash. 72, 147 Pac. 436 (1915); Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205,
73 S.E. 716, 38 L.R.A. (N.s.) 950 (1912), [1913D] Ann. Cas. 1129; see Shirey v.
Shirey, 87 Ark. 175, 112 S.W. 369, 372 (1908); Cohen, supra note 1, at 417;
Robinson, supra note 2, at 134.
10. Tilton v. Tilton, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 538, 29 S.W. 290 (1895); Watts v. Watts,
160 Mass. 464, 36 N.E. 479, 23 L.R.A. 187, 39 Am. St. Rep. 509 (1894).
11. Watts v. Watts, 160 Mass. 464, 36 N.E. 479, 23 L.R.A. 187, 39 Am. St. Rep.
509 (1894).
12. Averbuch v. Averbuch, 80 Wash. 257, 141 Pac. 701 (1914). Cf. Campbell
v. Jones, 230 S.W. 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Middleton v. Nibling, 142 S.W.
968 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); see Appleton v. Appleton, 97 Wash. 199, 166 Pac. 61"
(1917); 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 689, 693 (5th ed. 1925); 27 AM. JUR., Husband
and Wife § 425 (1940).
13. Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Turney, 235 Mo. 80, 138 S.W. 12 (1911); cf. Middle-
ton v. Nibling, 142 S.W. 968 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 689
(5th ed. 1925).
14. Bates v. Bates, 53 Nev. 72, 292 Pac. 298 (1930); Averbuch v. Averbuch,
80 Wash. 257, 141 Pac. 701 (1914) (by implication); Vickers v. Vickers, 95
W. Va. 323, 122 S.E. 279 (1924), 41 A.L.R. 266 (1926); 44 HARv. L. REv. 996
(1931).
15. Appleton v. Appleton, 97 Wash. 199, 166 Pac. 61 (1917); see Averbuch
v. Averbuch, supra note 14; Note, 31 ORE. L. REV. 62 (1951).
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one of the parties in that proceeding. 6 For instance, if a husband
fails to allege his wife's act of adultery as a defense to the wife's
separate maintenance suit or as a counter-claim in that suit, he will
not be barred from later using that same act as the basis for a suit for
absolute divorce. To assert the wife's adultery in the former case
might bar any chance or hope of the husband for a reconciliation. 7
If reconciliation then failed, the husband would not be penalized for
failure to assert his claim.'8
The law encourages reconciliations and the resumption of marital
relations between estranged spouses.19 Although the rules of res
adjudicata apply in divorce actions, it is desirable that the decisions
in divorce cases be regulated by the social interests involved, rather
than by more legalistic considerations which might bar a chance of
reconciliation. 20
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE-FEDERAL
STATUTORY RIGHT-CHARACTERIZATION OF
RIGHT FOR PURPOSE OF APPLYING STATE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In an action brought in the Federal District Court of Kansas to re-
cover treble damages under the Clayton Act,' it was necessary for the
court to determine which of two provisions of the Kansas statute of
limitations was applicable.2 Defendant urged that the court adopt the
Kansas interpretation of its statute and apply the provision covering
actions for statutory penalties. Plaintiff argued that, the action being
federally created, and the Supreme Court having characterized a
similar action under the Sherman Act as non-penal, the court was
bound to apply the state limitation on statutory liabilities other than
penalties. Held: In determining the nature of this action for purposes
of applying a state statute of limitations, the court will follow the
federal definition of "statutory penalties" and will consider the action
remedial and compensatory, not penal. Fulton v. Loew's Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 676 (D. Kan. 1953).
16. Campbell v. Jones, 230 S.W. 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (by implication);
2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 689 (5th ed. 1925); Note, 31 ORE. L. REV. 62
(1951); 44 HARv. L. REV. 996 (1931).
17. See Gustafson v. Gustafson, 178 Minn. 1, 226 N.W. 412, 414 (1929); Note,
31 ORE. L. REV. 62 (1951).
18. See Gustafson v. Gustafson, supra note 17, at 414.
19. Accord, Appleton v. Appleton, 97 Wash. 199, 166 Pac. 61 (1917); Note, 31
ORE. L. REV. 62 (1951); 44 HARV. L. REv. 996 (1931).
20. Gustafson v. Gustafson, 178 Minn. 1, 226 N.W. 412 (1929) (by implication);
29 CoL. L. RE V. 1015 (1929).
1. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1951).
2. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-306 (1949) ("action upon a statute for penalty or
forfeiture" subject to one-year limitation; three-year limitation placed upon




Whether a state statute of limitations is applicable to a right created
by federal statute, enforceable only in federal courts and subject to
no federal limitation, was answered affirmatively by the Supreme
Court in Campbell v. Haverhill. Language in the Campbell case
indicated that state statutes should be applied according to their local
interpretation.4 However, a later Supreme Court decision in Chatta-
nooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. Atlanta,5 coupled with a reluctance
on the part of some federal courts to apply the Campbell rule fully,
has resulted in considerable confusion among federal courts when
they are called upon to apply state limitations on statutory penalties
to actions brought under the Clayton Act. In the Chattanooga Foundry
case the Court, in considering the appropriate limitation on a right of
action for treble damages created by the Sherman Act,6 declined to
apply a federal five-year limitation on "any suit or prosecution for
any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the
laws of the United States. '7 The Court relied on a restrictive construc-
tion of the phrase "suit for a penalty" which it had previously an-
nounced$ Having determined the federal statute to be inapplicable,
the Court accepted the lower tribunal's decision as to the applicable
state statute of limitations. The Court stated that weight was given
to the opinion of the lower court because the question involved the
construction of local law and the judge who rendered the decision
had had considerable experience on the state supreme court. The
state statutes, however, included a limitation on penal actions, and
the Supreme Court did not make clear whether this limitation was
disregarded because it was inapplicable under state law, or because
it was precluded by the court's determination that the action was
non-penal insofar as the federal statute was concernedY
With these decisions for authority, and confronted with state inter-
3. 155 U.S. 610 (1895). See generally Blume and George, Limitations and
the Federal Courts, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 937 (1951).
4. "In creating a new right and providing a court for the enforcement of such
right, must we not presume that congress intended that the remedy should be
enforced in the manner common to like actions within the same jurisdiction?"
Campbell v. Haverhill, note 3 supra, at 616.
5. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
6. 26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1951) (operation of provision
restricted to violations of Sherman Act).
7. RE V. STAT. § 1047 (1875), superseded by 62 STAT. 974 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A_
§ 2462 (1950).
8. See Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S-
657 (1892).
9. The following language by Holmes, J., is the genesis of the confusion:
"As to the article touching statutory penalties, notwithstanding some grounds-
for distinguishing it from Rev. Stat. Sec. 1047, which were pointed out, so far-
as this liability under the laws of the United States is concerned we must
adhere to the construction of it which we already have adopted." Chattanooga
Foundry and Pipe Works v. Atlanta, note 5 supra, at 398. For the lower court's
opinion see Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works, 127 Fed. 23 (6th
Cir. 1903), reversing Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry and Pipe Works, 101
Fed. 900 (C.C.E.D. Tenn. 1900).
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pretations which place actions for multiple damages within the scope
of their limitations on statutory penalties,' federal courts have fol-
lowed two divergent lines of approach. Courts adopting the "state"
approach rely upon the state's construction of its statutes and cite
the Chattanooga Foundry case as authority for this view;" courts
taking the "federal' approach apply what they consider the rule of the
Chattanooga Foundry case, that the action is remedial and compensa-
tory, and then select the appropriate state limitation statute.
12
The court in the instant case reviewed the Chattanooga Foundry
decision and found it vague on this point. Nevertheless, it concluded
that the federal approach is both "reasonable" and "permissible,"
looking with approval on three major arguments used by courts which
have adopted the federal approach: (1) that state interpretations
would assert a creative influence on an exclusively federal action;15
(2) that differing state interpretations would cause a lack of uniform-
ity in federal decisions determining the nature of the action; 14 and
(3) that other questions directly concerned with the proper period of
limitation have been answered in accordance with federal law.
The federal approach, when viewed in the light of a scrupulous
interpretation of the Chattanooga Foundry case and a careful exam-
ination of the arguments presented, seems to be without substantial
basis and a clear departure from the rule announced in the Campbell
case. The Chattanooga Foundry case held that the federal limitation
on statutory penalties did not apply to an action created by the Sher-
man Act. Federal courts which find in that holding a rule obviating
the applicability of state penal statutes seem to feel that the charac-
10. M.H. Vestal Co. v. Robertson, 277 Ill. 425, 115 N.E. 629 (1917); Sherill v.
Stewart, 199 Miss. 216,-23 So.2d 915 (1945); Butler v. Butler, 62 S.C. 165, 40 S.E.
138 (1901). ,
11. Hoskins v. Truax-Traer, 191 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1951), 65 HAM L. REv.
1457 (1952); Florida Wholesale Drug, Inc. v. Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc.,
110 F. Supp. 573 (D.N.J. 1953).
12. Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D. Colo. 1952);
Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, 43 F. Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1942). But cf.
Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
("federal" approach ostensibly used, but "state" result reached by ultimate
reliance on state interpretations).
13. Electric Theater Co. v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937
(W.D. Mo. 1953).
14. Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D. Colo. 1952).
See Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COL. L. REV. 68
(1953); 65 HARv. L. REV. 1457 (1952).
15. Several situations have been treated as federal questions. Rawlings v. Ray,
312 U.S. 96 (1941) (accrual of the cause of action); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d
136 (2d Cir. 1947) (commencement of the action); Culver v. Bell, 146 F.2d 29
(9th Cir. 1944) (whether an amendment relates back to the complaint); Barnes
Coal Co. v. Retail Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942) (survivability).
Others have been considered to be governed by state law. Burnham Chemical
Co. v. Borax Consolidated, 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1948) (fraudulent conceal-
ment of cause of action); Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, 43 F. Supp. 996
(D. Mass. 1942) (whether an action brought in a federal court resulted in
reversal otherwise than on the merits so as to come within state law governing
renewal of such actions).
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terization of an action as penal or remedial for purposes of applying a
statute of limitations becomes a part of the action itself. In reality, it
would seem that such a determination of the nature of an action is
not a construction of the action, but a construction of the statute of
limitations under consideration, and has no binding effect on the
statutes of limitations of other jurisdictions which may be applicable
to the same action. The opposite view, which implies that a right can
be characterized in the abstract and that such characterization becomes
part of the action for all purposes, has created a situation where, had
Kansas enacted a statute placing a specific one year limitation on all
actions for multiple damages, the court in the instant case would have
been bound to apply it; yet in the absence of such a statute the court
could and did refuse to accept a limitation on statutory penalties
which, through state judicial determination, includes actions for
multiple damages.
In support of the "federal approach" it is argued that uniformity
demands that all federal courts consider the action created by the
Clayton Act as non-penal. If this were done, a uniformity in applying
only state limitations on remedial actions would be achieved. Yet this
would be only a fractional step toward complete uniformity, since
variety in result will remain so long as there are differing periods of
limitations from state to state. No doubt, the solution lies in a federal
statute of limitations. Until the enactment of legislation, the diver-
gence in views should be resolved in favor of uniformity in conforming
to state law. Refusal to accept state interpretations achieves no com-
plete uniformity, but only requires that federal courts follow the in-
congruous practice of applying state statutes without the state inter-
pretations which give them meaning.
INCOME TAXATION-TAXABLE INCOME-INCLUSION OF
PROCEEDS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Plaintiff, Glenshaw Glass Co., sued the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue for a refund of income taxes exacted from a settlement of a
claim for treble damages which arose under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act.' Another plaintiff, William- Goldman Theatres, Inc., sued the
Commissioner for a refund of income taxes paid on the proceeds of a
judgment obtained pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Tax
Court held for the taxpayers,2 and the Commissioner appealed. The
two cases were heard at the same time before the United States Court
1.38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1951).
2. Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 18 T.C. 860 (1952);
William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 19 T.C. 637
(1953).
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Held, affirmed. Punitive damages are
not taxable income. Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
211 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1954).
The Sixteenth Amendment gave Congress power to lay and collect
taxes on income from whatever source derived,3 but Congress left to
the courts the task of determining the proper bounds of taxable income
by enacting a tax statute containing the broad language of the Amend-
ment rather than a definition of income. 4 There has been no agreement
among economists, accountants or lawyers as to the exact meaning of
"income," but as early as 1913 it had been judicially defined as the gain
derived from capital, labor or both combined,' and in 1920 the Supreme
Court completed what has become the traditional definition, in Eisner
v. Macomber,6 by adding profits gained through a sale or conversion of
capital assets. This definition, limiting income to three sources, became
the basis for exempting windfalls, punitive damages,s and prizes
and awards which required no rendition of servicesY In the 1954 Code,
however, Congress showed dissatisfaction with the traditional defini-
tion by taxing all prizes and awards.' Even prior to 1954 the courts
had been broadening the definition by taxing the proceeds of extor-
tion,1 certain settlements of claims or damages in lawsuits, 2 and the
increase in value of improved land regained by forfeiture.18 The
Eisner definition, therefore, does not state the present limits of taxable
income.
Highland Farms Corp. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev.,1 4 the first case
in which the issue of taxability of punitive damages was squarely pre-
sented, excluded punitive damages from taxable income on the basis
of the Eisner definition. The instant case, following the Highland
Farms decision, reaches its holding on the basis of several reasons:
(1) punitive damages are not included in the Eisner definition of in-
come; (2) punitive damages are a gift from the injuring party taken
from his pocket by the law; (3) punitive damages are analogous to a
3. U.S. CoNsT. AImEND. XVI.
4. INT. REV. CODE §§ 61, 63 (1954).
5. Strattons Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).
6. 252 U.S. 189. 207 (1920).
7. Central R.R. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 79 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1935), 101
A.L.R. 1448 (1936).
8. Highland Farms Corp. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
9. Washburn v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 5 T.C. 1333 (1945).
10. INT. REv. CODE § 74 (1954).
11. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
12. Blease v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 16 B.T.A. 972 (1929); Buffalo Union
Furnace Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 23 B.T.A. 439 (1931) (damages for
services rendered); Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931)
(damages for expenditures under a contract); Helvering v. William Flaccus
Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247 (1941) (damages for loss of property in excess of
its cost).
13. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
14. 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940).
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contribution by the sovereign, in the general public interest, to an
individual; (4) punitive damages are a windfall and the ordinary
man would not regard them as income within the terms of common
speech.
However, the Eisner definition does not represent the present status
of the law and should not be controlling. As a gift, punitive damages
lack both a voluntary intent and usual gift motivation, i.e., love and
affection. In comparing punitive damages to a contribution by the
sovereign, the court relied on Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 15 in which money
contributed to the capital of the corporation was held not taxable, but
there seems to be little in common between punitive damages and
contributions by non-stockholders to a corporation's capital. The
common-speech test has been uttered with approval by the Supreme
Court,1 but with the warning by Justice Holmes that the meaning of
a word is a growing thing.17 The Court of Claims taxed a recovery
under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,Is and declared
that all windfalls are within the meaning of income.' 9 In General
American Investors Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 20 the Tax Court
approved taxation of money recovered under Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, but expressly stated that money so recovered
was not punitive damages. It did this so as not to disturb its earlier
holding on the nontaxability of punitive damages. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion 2' by Judge Medina, affirmed
the judgment against the corporation without designating the pay-
ments as either windfall or penalty, considering the question irrele-
vant.
Judge Medina, finding no infallible way to determine the limits of
taxable income, suggested that the old exclusion by rigid adherence
to a definition should give way to policy considerations in an empirical
case-by-case approach. It would then be possible, on the one hand,
to argue that treble damages collected under antitrust laws such as
the Clayton Act should be non-taxable because they serve the public
good by encouraging such lawsuits, and at the same time argue that
punitive damages in tort cases offer a desirable source of taxation,
lacking the evils of penalizing hard work and initiative.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on the other -hand, contends
15. 268 U.S. 628 (1925).
16. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931); Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-7 (1920).
17. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
18. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b) (1951).
19. Park and Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 941 (Ct.
Cl. 1952) (corporation recovered profit made by director who purchased and
sold shares of corporation's stock in the open market within a six-month
period).
20. 19 T.C. 581 (1952).
21. 211 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1954).
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that taxable income is any increase in net worth through the receipt
of money or property except where specifically excluded by the
statute.22 Because there is no agreement as to what is income, under
the Commissioner's approach the exclusions are dictated on policy
considerations by Congress alone. However, Congress, having defined
income in vague, general language, would seem to have left it to the
courts to set the precise boundary lines by means of this case-by-case
approach. The holding of the instant case may be justified on grounds
of policy, even though both the courts and Congress have shown dis-
satisfaction with the traditional definition and have approved Judge
Medina's approach.
NATURAL GAS ACT-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-
SCOPE OF STATUTE AS AFFECTED BY
SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS
Phillips Petroleum Company, an independent producer and gather-
er,' sold natural gas to an interstate pipeline company. The Federal
Power Commission instituted proceedings 2 to determine whether
Phillips' sales to an interstate pipeline company were within the
purview of the Natural Gas Act.3 The Commission denied jurisdiction
to regulate Phillips' rates.4 The court of appeals reversed. Held
(5-3),6 affirmed. The purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to occupy
the area which had been- held to be immune from state regulation,
and the sale of natural gas by independent producers was a portion
of this area. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954),
rehearing denied, 75 Sup. Ct. 17 (1954).
The problem in the instant case is essentially one of statutory
construction. The Natural Gas Act confers on the Federal Power
Commission jurisdiction over "the sale in interstate commerce
of natural gas for resale"; however, the "production or gather-
ing of natural gas" is exempt from the purview of the statute.7
22. Instant Case at 930.
1. An independent producer and gatherer of natural gas is one who neither
engages in the transportation of natural gas in interstate pipelines nor is
affiliated with an interstate pipeline company. See Berger and Krash, The
Status of Independent Producers under the Natural Gas Act, 30 TEXAs L. REV.
29 n.1 (1951).
2. 7 F.P.C. 983 (1948).
3. 52 STAT. 821 § 1 (b) (1938), 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 (b) (1948).
4. In re Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246, 90 P.U.R. (N.s.) 325 (1951), 52
COL. L. REV. 135 (1952).
5. Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953), 22
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 118 (1953), 32 TExAs L. R v. 762 (1954).
6. Opinion by Mr. Justice Minton; concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter; dissenting opinions by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Clark with
Mr. Justice Burton concurring; Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of the case.
7. 52 STAT. 821 § 1(b) (1938), 15 U.S.C.A. § 717(b) (1948).
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Phillips' activity lies in the area which is overlapped by the language
of the grant of jurisdiction and that of the exemption." Although
exceptions to the primary grant of authority are to be strictly con-
strued,9 this rule would seem to be inapplicable in the instant case
because the "production or gathering" exemption was not intended
to be covered by the language in the affirmative grant of jurisdiction.'0
Since the language of the statute is susceptible to two conflicting
interpretations, resort to the legislative history of the Natural Gas
Act is appropriate, as indicated in the instant case." Extensive
research in the legislative history, however, does not reveal conclusive
or controlling evidence of congressional intent to deal with the
specific problem of wholesale sales by independent producers.
2
It is generally recognized that the primary purpose of the Natural
Gas Act was to complement state regulation 3 Prior to the enactment
8. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, said, "The sale by this
independent producer is a 'sale in interstate commerce ... for resale.' It is also
an integral part of 'the production or gathering of natural gas,' .. for it is the
end phase of the producing and gathering process. So we must make a choice;
and the choice is not an easy one." Instant Case at 688.
For discussion of the Phillips case and the problem of regulation of inde-
pendent producers, see Baker and Illig, Natural Gas Supplies for Tomorrow, 19
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 361 (1954); Berger and Krash, The Status of Independ-
ent Producers under the Natural Gas Act, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 29 (1951); Hard-
wicke, Some Consequences of Fears by Independent Producers of Gas of
Federal Regulation, 19 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 342 (1954)-; McLane, Jurisdiction
of the Federal Power Commission over Production and Gathering of Gas, 28
TuLANE L. REv. 343 (1954); Ross and Foster, Phillips and the Natural Gas Act,
19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 382 (1954); Scanlan, Administrative Abnegation in
the Face of Congressional Coercion: The Interstate Natural Gas Company
Affair, 23 NOTRE DAME LAW. 173 (1948); Notes, 17 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 479 (1950),
59 YALE L.J. 1468 (1950).
9. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 690-91
(1947). But see 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4936
(3d ed., Horack, 1943).
10. "The [exceptions] are not actually necessary, as the matters specified
therein could not be said fairly to be covered by the language affirmatively
stating the jurisdiction of the Commission, but similar language was in previous
bills, and rather than invite the contention, however unfounded, that theelimi-
nation of the negative language would broaden the scope of the Act, the com-
mittee has included it in this bill." H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3
(1937); the Senate Report adopted the House Report, SEN. REP. No. 1162, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937).
11. Instant Case at 682; see 2 SUTHERLAMD, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 5001 (3d ed., Horack, 1943).
12. Compare the majority opinion, with the dissenting opinions in the follow-
ing cases: In re Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246, 90 P.U.R. (N.s.) 325
(1951); In re Columbian Fuel Corporation, 2 F.P.C. 200, 35 P.U.R. (N.s.) 3
(1940). The hearings and debates in Congress indicate primary concern with
the regulation of interstate transportation; and there is somewhat vague testi-
mony indicating intent to exclude independent producers and gatherers from
the scope of the Natural Gas Act. See Berger and Krash, The Status of Inde-
pendent Producers under the Natural Gas Act, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 29, 32-37
'(1951).
13. Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,. 337 U.S.
49g, 502-3, 509-15 (1949); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507. 519-21 (1947); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n. 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 609-10 (1944); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 467 (1943).
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of the Natural Gas Act, the Supreme Court had held that the com-
merce clause of the Constitution prohibited state regulation of the
rates of natural gas sold to local distributors after transportation
across state lines and the wholesale rates of electricity moving in
interstate commerce.14 The Natural Gas Act was passed to occupy
this area of the natural gas industry which the states could not regu-
late.15 Since the scope of the Natural Gas Act ended where state
regulation began, there was to be no overlapping or imbrication of
federal and state jurisdiction.16 The Court in the instant case con-
cluded that the decisions, prior to the enactment of the Natural Gas
Act, prohibited the states from regulating the wholesale sales by in-
dependent producers and gatherers in interstate commerce.17 Assuming
this to be an accurate interpretation of these decisions, the scope of the
Natural Gas Act at the time of enactment encompassed the wholesale
sales by independent producers and gatherers in interstate com-
merce.18
Subsequent to the enactment of the Natural Gas Act, the Supreme
Court modified its view of the commerce clause, and the area subject
to state regulation was expanded. In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peer-
less Oil & Gas Co.,' 9 the Supreme Court held that a state is constitu-
tionally competent to regulate, as a conservation measure, the well-
head price of natural gas sold by a producer in interstate commerce.
The majority in the instant case seems to concede that after the
Natural Gas Act was passed, the constitutional restriction on state
regulation of sales by independent producers in interstate commerce
was relaxed; but the Court rejected consideration of these cases
14. Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924);
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co.. 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
See Howard, Gas and Electricity in Interstate Commerce, 18 MINN. L. REV. 611,
660-91 (1934).
15. H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937); SEN. REP. No. 1162, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1937); Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 690 (1947); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 609-10 (1944).
16. Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498,
513 (1949).
17. Instant Case at 683.
18. Phillips disputed the accuracy of this interpretation. Instant Case at 677.
In Public Utilities Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927),
and Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924), the
Supreme Court held that wholesale sales made in the stream of interstate
commerce by interstate pipeline companies to local distributors were national
in character and thus immune from state regulation. Phillips was not an inter-
state pipeline company and its sales were not made in the stream of interstate
commerce to local distributors. Therefore, it would seem questionable that
these decisions brand Phillips' activity as essentially national in character and
thus not subject to state regulation. See Berger and Krash, The Status of
Independent Producers under the Natural Gas Act, 30 TEXAS L. REV, 29, 35-37
(1951).




because the scope of the Natural Gas Act was to be determined at
the time of its enactment.20
It is generally accepted that the language of a statute may include
circumstances uncontemplated at the time of its enactment.2 1 More-
over, it would seem that the purview of a statute may be expanded
to encompass situations consonant with the language and purpose of
the statute but not envisioned by the legislature to be constitutionally
subject to regulation.22 Assuming that when the Natural Gas Act
was passed, the Supreme Court had construed the commerce clause
to permit the states to regulate the rates of independent producers,
the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission would not attach
because the Natural Gas Act was designed to complement state
regulation.23 However, if the Supreme Court, after enactment of the
Natural Gas Act, had overruled the decision permitting the states to
regulate the rates of independent producers, it would seem that juris-
diction of the Federal Power Commission would attach because the
purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to occupy the area in which the
states may not act.24 This would be an expansion of the scope of a
statute consistent with its purpose to complement state regulation and
to avoid a hiatus in the regulation of the natural gas industry. If the
purview of a statute may expand, it would seem logically to follow
that it may contract if the circumstances warrant and the language
may bear such a judicial construction.25 An overruling would not be
prerequisite to this conclusion since there are no previous decisions on
the specific problem.
When the Natural Gas Act was passed, its scope included sales by
independent producers in interstate commerce because the states
were not then constitutionally competent to regulate this area; sub-
sequently the commerce clause was construed to permit the states to
regulate this area. Therefore, it would seem that the scope of the
20. Instant Case at 684.
21. Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 339 (1941); 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5102 (3d ed., Horack, 1943); Llewel-
lyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
about how Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
22. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
"We have been shown not one piece of reliable evidence that the Congress of
1890 intended to freeze the proscription of the Sherman Act within the mold of
then current judicial decisions defining the commerce power." Id. at 557. Cf.
Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942). But cf. Federal Power
Comm'n v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 472 (1950); Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U.S. 371 (1943); Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941);
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941), 50 YALE L.J.
1294. For an excellent discussion of this concept, see Lyon, Old Statutes and
New Constitution, 44 COL. L. REV. 599 (1944).
23. See note 13 supra.
24. See note 15 supra.
25. "While a statute is presumed to speak from the time of its enactment, it
embraces all such persons or things as subsequently fall within its scope, and
ceases to apply to such as thereafter fall without its scope." De Lima v. Bid-
well, 182 U.S. 1, 197 (1901).
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Natural Gas Act should be contracted in order to complement state
regulation by occupying only that area in which the states may not
now validly act. The decision in the instant case, granting jurisdiction
to the Federal Power Commission to regulate the rates of independent
producers, would seem to create an imbrication of federal and state
jurisdiction. An avowed purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to
avoid such a plight.
NEGLIGENCE-USED-CAR DEALER-DUTY TO INSPECT
Defendant used-car dealer purchased and resold a used automobile
without inspecting it. After driving only a few blocks, the vendee
lost control of the car due to defective brakes and ran against plaintiff,
who brought suit against the used-car dealer for resulting injuries.
From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed. Held, affirmed.
A used-car dealer may be liable to third persons for negligence in sell-
ing an automobile which he has not used reasonable care to inspect,
even though he had no actual knowledge of the defects and made no
representation as to the condition of the automobile. Gaidry Motors,
Inc. v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954).
It is now a widely recognized principle of tort law that a manufac-
turer, vendor or supplier of an article may be liable to third persons
for supplying the article in a defective condition, although the rule
for many years seems to have been otherwise.' Since the landmark
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.2 manufacturers of chattels
have been held liable to ultimate consumers3 and to more remote
plaintiffs.4 Furthermore, injured third persons may recover from
bailors, lessors and vendors of chattels if the defendant: (1) fails to
apprise the vendee or bailee of known defects, (2) represents the
article to be in safe condition, or (3) repairs or inspects the article
negligently.5
1. Eldredge, Vendor's Tort Liability, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rpv. 306 (1941); Note,
[1950] WASH. U.L.Q. 85; 30 Cal-KENT REv. 168 (1952);,19 TENN. L. REv. 800
(1947).
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, [1916F] L.R.A. 696 (1916).
3. Duval v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Ill. App. 290, 68 N.E.2d 479 (1946);
Notes, 142 A.L.R. 1490 (1943), 140 A.L.R. 191 (1942). But cf. Harward v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 235 N.C. 88, 68 S.E.2d 855 (1952) (insufficient evidence).
4. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927);
Okker v. Chrome Furniture Mfg. Corp., 26 N.J. Super. 295, 97 A.2d 699 (1953)
(defective'tavern stool); Note, 122 A.L.R. 997 (1939); RESTATEMENT, TORTS
395 (1934). -
5. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373, 122 A.L.R. 987 (8th Cir.
1939) (defendant undertook to recondition); Al DeMent Chevrolet Co. v.
Wilson, 252 Ala. 662, 42 So.2d 585 (1949) (gratuitous bailment); Kothe v.
Tysdale, 233 Minn. 163, 46 N.W.2d 233 (1951) (house trailer with defective
hitch); Vaughn v. Millington Motor Co., 160 Tenn. 197, 22 S.W.2d 226 (1929);
Flies v. Fox Brothers Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928), 60 A.L.R.
357 (1929) (vendor represented vehicle to be safe).
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While the cases'contain some confusing language regarding the
dangerous character of the automobile, it appears settled that auto-
mobile suppliers are subject to the rules of ordinary negligence, rather
than to the rules applicable to "inherently dangerous" articles.6 The
course of conduct which will constitute due care may vary, however,
depending upon what class of supplier is involved. Manufacturers
and bailors are apparently bound to exercise more care in selling or
letting their vehicles than are other vendors.7 In some jurisdictions a
duty is imposed by statute." There has been little litigation involving
casual or non-habitual suppliers. It seems doubtful that in the near
future this class of defendants will be held liable to third persons for
mere failure to discover defects.9
Used-car dealers have in some situations been held liable to third
persons for negligence in supplying defective automobiles.'0 This
liability has sometimes arisen from violation of a statutory duty to
inspect the vehicle before sale,1 but more often liability has been
predicated upon the failure to exercise reasonable care to discover
defects which would render the vehicle a menace upon the high-
ways.1 2 Only rarely, however, has liability been imposed for the mere
failure to inspect,' 3 and doubt has been expressed as to the propriety
of holding vendors to such a duty.14 In the great majority of cases
there has been some additional element which constituted actionable
6. "It is common knowledge that an automobile with defective brakes is
... a dangerous instrumentality .... An automobile dealer is not an insurer
against the defective condition of a car put into the hands of a prospective
purchaser ....." Bogart v. Cohen-Anderson Motor Co., 164 Ore. 233, 98 P.2d 720,
721 (1940).
7. PROSSER, TORTS 681 (1941); Note, [1950] WASH. U.L.Q. 85, 89 (1950); see
Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co., 111 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. 1937). But see
Kaplan v. Stein, 198 Md. 414, 84 A.2d 81, 84 (1951) (refutes distinction between
gratuitous bailor and bailor for hire); Standard Oil Co. v. Leaverton. 239 Mo.
App. 284, 192 S.W.2d 681 (1946).
8. Kaplan v. Stein, 198 Md. 414. 84 A.2d 81 (1951) ; Bogart v. Cohen-Anderson
Motor Co., 164 Ore. 233, 98 P.2d 720 (1940).
9. See [1953] WASH. U.L.Q. 443.
10. See Notes, 170 A.L.R. 611, 676 (1947), 122 A.L.R. 997 (1939), 99 A.L.R. 240
(1935).
11. Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal.2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952); Kaplan v. Stein, 198
Md. 414, 84 A.2d 81 (1951); Bogart v. Cohen-Anderson Motor Co., 164 Ore.
233, 98 P.2d 720 (1940).
12. "[A] dealer in used motor vehicles . . . is generally under a duty to
exercise reasonable care in making an examination thereof to discover defects
therein which would make them dangerous to users or to those who might
come in contact with them, and upon discovery to correct those defects or at
least give warning to the purchaser." Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St.
465, 110 N.E.2d 419, 423, [1953] WASH. U.L.Q. 443 (1953).
13. Al DeMent Chevrolet Co. v. Wilson, 252 Ala. 662, 42 So.2d 585 (1949);
Standard Oil Co. v. Leaverton, 239 Mo. App. 284, 192 S.W.2d 681 (1946), 12 Mo. L.
REv. 57 (1947). In neither case had the sale been consummated; there were
bailments for demonstration purposes.
14. "These decisions... are not only a departure from sound theory but on
their facts they are unwholesome precedents which invite litigious purchasers
and unscrupulous lawyers to build up cases to mulct retailers in damages."
Eldredge, supra note 1, at 331. The comment is not, however, directed speci-
fically at automobile vendors.
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negligence. This element has been found in the vendor's actual
knowledge of the defect,15 his representation that the car was in
satisfactory condition, 6 or his affirmative undertaking to recondi-
tion.1
7
An important matter for consideration in this class of cases is the
significance to be attached to the intervening negligence of the vendee
or another. The courts are in disagreement on the question of whether
such intervening negligence will insulate the liability of the used-car
dealer to injured third persons.'8 Proximate causation must be estab-
lished, and its existence will depend upon the facts of each case.19
The apparent effect of the decision in the instant case is the imposi-
tion of a duty upon used-car dealers to make an inspection of the
vehicle before sale. As the dissent points out, however, it is doubtful
that the court needed to go so far, since there was evidence of defend-
ant's actual knowledge of the defect, which he failed to convey to the
vendee.20 Moreover, the case leaves open several important questions.
Among them are inquiries as to what classes of vendors are now
obligated to inspect chattels before sale and what chattels must be
inspected. Although the case seems consistent with the modern trend
toward extending tort liability, there is little precedent for the present
extension, nor are its limits yet defined. While these matters may be
determined by future decisions, legislative action to clarify the duties
of used-car dealers and other vendors would seem desirable.
15. See Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C. 693, 9 S.E.2d 395, 396 (1940).
16. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373, 122 A.L.R. 987 (8th Cir. 1939) ;
Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C. 693, 9 S.E.2d 395 (1940); Thrash v.
U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953): Flies v. Fox Brothers
Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 357 (1929); Bock v.
Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wash.2d 458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943).
17. Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373, 122 A.L.R. 987 (8th Cir. 1939);
Kaplan v. Stein, 198 Md. 414, 84 A.2d 81 (1951).
18. Kaplan v. Stein, 198 Md. 414, 84 A.2d 81 (1951) (no); Ford Motor Co. v.
Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840, 13 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 518 (1946), 19
TENN. L. REv. 800 (1947) (yes).
19. In Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wash.2d 458, 139 P.2d 706 (1943), the
defendant used-car dealer was held liable to a third-party plaintiff where the
truck sold had a defective spring, and the resulting accident took place 25 days
after the sale. But in an action by a vendee who was burned while trying to
plug a leaky gas tank 36 days after the sale, the defendant used car dealer's
negligence was found not to be the proximate cause of injury. Ayers v.
Amatucci, 206 Okla. 366, 243 P.2d 716 (1952).
20. Instant Case at 630.
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SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-REQUIREMENT OF PRIVITY
BETWEEN PROCESSOR AND -ULTIMATE CONSUMER
Plaintiff brought actions for negligence and breach of implied
warranty alleging that his show dogs had become ill as a result of
having eaten packaged dog food processed by defendant and sold to
plaintiff by a third person. Defendant moved to dismiss the warranty
action for lack of privity. Held, motion denied. Under California
law, privity is not essential to support an action for breach of implied
warranty by an ultimate user against the processor of impure animal
food. McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954). .
At common law an action could be brought by the purchaser against
the retailer of impure and unwholesome food for human consumption
on the theory of breach of implied warranty.' It is not clear whether
this action was an evolution of trespass on the case for deceit, or the
result of statute, or some combination of both.2 Most jurisdictions
which today allow such an action require privity of warranty in order
for the consumer to recover; 3 there is, however, a minority contra.
4
Of the American jurisdictions that have passed on the question, a
majority has permitted the owner of an animal killed or injured by
impure food to recover from the seller of the food on an implied war-
ranty, usually a warranty of fitness for purpose arising out of the
buyer's having relied on the judgment of the seller.5 A minority denies
the owner recovery from the seller on implied warranty notwith-
standing the seller's knowledge, and forces the owner to base his case
on negligence.6
On the other hand, a strong American minority has endorsed without
qualification the holding that the processor of human food is liable to
the ultimate consumer on an implied warranty of purity, notwith-
1. 3 BL. COMM. 1119, 1157 (Lewis' ed. 1902); Ames, History of Assumpsit,
2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1888); see also the discussion by Parke, B., in Burnby
v. Bollett, 16 M. & W. 644, 153 Eng. Rep. 1348 (Ex. 1849).
2. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 241 (Rev. ed. 1948). Compare 3 BL. COMM. 1119, n.
30 (Lewis' ed. 1902) with Id. at 1157, n. 53. See also 37 MARQ. L. REV. 356 (1954).
3. Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923); 22 AM.
JUR., Food § 96 (1939) ; 77 C.J.S., Sales § 305b(3) (1952).
4. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); 77
C.J.S., Sales § 305b(3) (1952) and cases there cited.
5. Judd v. H.S. Coe & Co., 117 Conn. 510, 169 Atl. 270 (1933); Swift & Co. v.
Redhead, 147 Iowa 94, 122 N.W. 140 (1909); McBride v. Farmers' Seed Ass'n,
248 Ky. 514, 58 S.W.2d 909 (1933); Seaton Ranch Co. v. Montana Vegetable
Oil & Feed Co., 252 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1952); Poovey v. International Sugar Feed
No. 2 Co., 191 N.C. 722, 133 S.E. 12 (1926); Coyle v. Baum, 3 Okla. 695, 41 Pac.
389 (1895); Houk v. Berg, 105 S.W. 1176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907); Thatcher Mill-
ing & Elevator Co. v. Campbell, 64 Utah 422, 231 Pac. 621 (1924); Larson v.
Farmer's Warehouse Co.. 161 Wash. 640, 297 Pac. 753 (1931). See French v.
Vining, 102 Mass. 132 (1869), 3 Am. Rep. 440 (1912); Shute v. Levin, 66 Pa.
Super. 67 (1917).
6. National Cotton Oil Co. v. Young, 74 Ark. 144, 85 S.W. 92 (1905); Lukens
v. Freiund, 27 Kan. 664 (1882), 41 Am. Rep. 429 (1912); Dulaney v. Jones &
Rogers, 100 Miss. 835, 57 So. 225 (1912); A.H. Andrews & Son v. Harper, 137
Wash. 353, 242 Pac. 27 (1926).
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standing lack of privity.7 There is general confusion, however, as to
the rationale of this line of cases.8 In Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,9
upon which the opinion in the instant case is based, the Supreme Court
of California reviewed the cases adopting this point of view and com-
mented:
"[T]he foregoing authorities . . . are not in entire accord . . as to
the exact reasoning employed in holding a manufacturer liable on a war-
ranty theory .... Manifestly, however, the factor of public policy affords
a background for these decisions."' 0
The instant case is an extension and merger of the two lines of cases,
one on animal food and the other on human food, outlined above. It is
the first case that research reveals to have extended to animal foods
the implied warranty of human foods that sometimes runs from proc-
essor to user. In Pease & Dwyer Co. v. Somers Planting Co.," the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that an express warranty by a proc-
essor of animal food to a seller, which was admitted, could not be
extended to the ultimate user, and that there was no implied warranty
of fitness between processor and user. This is not surprising in view
of the holding of the same court in Dulaney v. Jones & Rogers,12 to the
effect that a user of animal food could not maintain a warranty action
against the seller. The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the view of
the Mississippi court in Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms13 when it held
that there could be no implied warranty between the processor and
the user without privity. In so holding, it followed its own precedent
regarding human food, set forth in Prinsen v. Russos.14 The California
7. Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Ezzell, 22 Ala. App. 210, 114 So. 278
(1927); Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P.2d 162 (1933); Klein v. Duchess
Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Davis v. Van Camp Packing
Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920), 17 A.L.R. 649 (1922); Parks v. G.C. Yost
Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914), [1915C] L.R.A. 179; Hertzler v. Man-
shum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N.W. 155 (1924); Armour & Co. v. McMillain, 171 Miss.
199, 155 So. 218 (1934); Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. App.
1942); Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916);
Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L, 748, 70 Atl. 314 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908) 19
L.R.A. (N.s.) 923 (1909); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161
N.E. 557 (1928); Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156
Atl. 537 (1931); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 829
(1942), 142 A.L.R. 1479 (1943). New York seems to be unsettled on the question.
Compare McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E.2d 513, 105 A.L.R. 1497 (1936)
with Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923).
8. See Notes, 142 A.L.R. 1490, 1494 (1943); 140 A.L.R. 191, 250 (1942); 111
A.L.R. 1239, 1251 (1937); 105 A.L.R. 1502, 1511 (1936); 88 A.L.R. 527, 534 (1934);
63 A.L.R. 340, 349 (1929); 39 A.L.R. 992, 1000 (1925); 17 A.L.R. 672, 709 (1922).
9. 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939), 15 IND. L.J. 242 (1940), 25 WAsH. U.L.Q.
293 (1940).
10. 93 P.2d 799, 804 (1939).
11. 130 Miss. 147, 93 So. 673 (1922).
12. 100 Miss. 835, 57 So. 225 (1912).
13. 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952), 7 RUTGERS L. REV. 420 (1953).
14. 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).
[ VOL. 8
RECENT CASES
Supreme Court, however, in Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.15 did
away with the requirement of privity of implied warranty in human
food cases between processor and user.16 Hence, the Cohan case and
the instant case are consistent to the extent that each applies the law
of its state on processed human food to processed animal food.
In view of the modern methods of packaging and handling processed
animal food, this case would seem to reach a fair result. It is perhaps
unfortunate, however, that the district court in its opinion seemed to
equate the value of animal life with that of human life.17 The implied
warranty of fitness for purpose that the court found in the Klein case
to run from the processor to the consumer under the Uniform Sales
Act would seem to offer a less questionable ground for the decision.
TORTS-UNATTENDED AUTOMOBILE STATUTE-LIABILITY
.OF OWNER FOR NEGLIGENT DRIVING OF THIEF
Defendant's employee, in violation of a statute,' left his taxicab
unattended with the key in the ignition lock and the motor running.
A thief stole the cab and while in flight negligently collided with the
parked car of the plaintiff. On appeal from a judgment2 affirming the
trial court's refusal to dismiss the complaint, held, affirmed.5 Violation
of the statute is negligence and creates a liability which becomes
15. 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
16. This was after the passage of [1931] CAL. STATS. 2239, CAL. Crv. CoDE §
1735 (Supp. 1953), a codification of § 15 of the Uniform Sales Act:
"Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf,
there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for
any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a
sale, except as follows: (1) Where the buyer expressly or by implica-
tion, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
such purpose."
The court said that the legislative intent was that strict privity of warranty
should not be enforced under this statute, and that its ruling was an expression
of the legislative intent.
17. "The same public policy considerations present for the protection of
humans in the use of packaged and processed foods are also present where
instead we deal with animals." Instant Case at 6.
1. "(a) No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to
stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and
removing the key, or when standing upon any perceptible grade without
effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the curb
or side of the highway. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 95Y, § 189(a) (Supp. 1953).
2. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 348 Ill. App. 161, 108 N.E.2d 508 (1952).
3. Previously there was a conflict of opinion on this subject in the appellate
courts of Illinois. The First District Appellate Court held the defendant liable
in Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948), 10 LA. L. REV.
554 (1950). Later the Third District Appellate Court held the defendant not
liable in Cockrell v. Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N.E.2d 878 (1951), 30 CHI-
KENT REV. 277 (1952).
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absolute if the jury finds that the violation was the proximate cause
of the accident. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74
(1954).
Most courts in the absence of statute4 have held the thief's act to
be an independent intervening cause,5 frequently assuming, without
deciding, that the owner was negligent. Though negligence is seldom
the crucial issue in these cases, most of the courts which have con-
sidered the question indicate that the owner is not guilty of negli-
gence.6
A violation of a criminal statute,7 as in the present case, is generally
assumed to be negligence. 8 However, does the statute so change the
common-law rule that the car owner becomes liable for the plaintiff's
injuries? There is a direct conflict on this question. Part of the
majority assumes the violation of an unattended-car statute to be
negligence.9 However, all majority courts say the violator's act is not
the proximate cause of the accident.10 They hold as a matter of law
that the thief's act in stealing the car and hitting the plaintiff or
his property is an efficient intervening cause.'1 Thus, as at common
law,'2 the plaintiff cannot recover from the car owner whose original
act laid the foundation for the plaintiff's injury.13 At least one
jurisdiction holds that, where the statute is violated, the decision
does not depend on the principle of intervening cause, but on the
question of whether the statute was passed for the purpose of averting
the risk of damage to the plaintiff. 4 Under this view the defendant's
4. Hereafter the word "statute" will include both statutes and ordinances
unless otherwise indicated.
5. Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142
Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super 254, 78 A.2d 288
(1951), [1951] WIs. L. REV. 740. Contra: Schaff v. Claxton, 144 F.2d 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1944).
6. See note 5 supra; PROSSER, TORTS 366 (1941).
7. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 16, § 232 (Supp. 1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 95/2, §
189a (Supp. 1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2124 (Burns Supp. 1953); MASS. ANN.
LAws c. 90, § 13 (Supp. 1954).
8. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), 158 A.L.R. 1370 (1945), cert.
denied 321 U.S. 790 (1944); cf. Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359 61 N.E.2d 330
(1945); Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1650), 35 MiNN.
L. REV. 81 (1951).
9. Slater v. T.C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927); Wannebo v.
Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W.2d 695 (1948); Volkert v. Diamond Truck Co.,
[1940] Can. Sup. Ct. 455.
10. See note 9 supra; Kiste v. Red Cab Co., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395
(1952); Sullivan v. Grifim, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945); Anderson v.
Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
11. See note 10 supra; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 448, comment a (1934).
12. Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142
Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288
(1951).
13. See note 10 supra.
14. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), 158 A.L.R. 1370 (1945),
cert. denied 321 U.S. 790 (1944). Cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286(a) (1934). See
MoRRIS, STUIms iN THE LAW OF TORTS, 151 (1952) (discussion of civil liability
based upon a v iolation of a criminal statute).
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violation of the statute is, as a matter of law, the legal (proximate)
cause of the plaintiff's injury. 5 A third point of view is adopted by
the court in the instant case. The court states that the purpose of the
statute is to prevent injury resulting from a thief's negligent driving.
There may be special circumstances, however, that will keep the car
owner from being liable. "Assume a defendant violates the statute
. . . yet . . . secures the doors . . . [o]r . . . has . . . a ... person
. . . watching the vehicle .... "16 Because of the possibility of the
special circumstances being present, the question of proximate cause
is held to be for the jury.
The court in the present case decided that the statute was passed
to protect the public from the negligent driving of thieves. The
majority view, which deems the thief's act to break the chain of
causation, interprets the statute as an anti-theft measure, not a safety
provision.1'7 Possibly the statute could be considered both a theft
statute and a safety measure s However, the Illinois court by the
present decision subjects car owners to a very heavy burden in
exchange for comparatively little protection to the public. It is
submitted that the majority courts are correct in saying, as a matter
of law, that there is not such a high probability of intervening crime
and pursuant negligent operation of the vehicle by a thief as to be
reasonably foreseeable.' 9
TRUSTS-POWERS OF TRUSTEES-COURT CONTROL
OF TRUSTEES' DISCRETION
Complainants, testamentary trustees holding titles to a department
store building, signed a 25-year lease agreement with a business com-
petitor of the occupant. As the lease would extend beyond the
probable duration of the trust, the trustees, pursuant to the agree-
ment, brought suit in the chancery court seeking a decree either
affirming their power to make the lease or confirming their actions as
being in the best interests of the cestuis que trust.' Guardians ad
15. Ross v. Hartman, supra note 14.
16. Instant Case at 80.
17. Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950); Sullivan v.
Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945).
18. Cf. Hines v. Foreman, 243 S.W. 479, 483-84 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).
19. For an admirable treatment of the view expressed in this sentence, see
Judge Achor's opinion in Kiste v. Red Cab Co., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d
395 (1952).
1. Where a trust is to continue for an indefinite period, as for the lives of
specified persons, there is a split of authority on whether a trustee has the
power to execute a lease likely to extend beyond the life of the trust, in absence
of express authority conferred in the trust instrument. Some courts hold that a
trustee may make such a lease where his conduct is reasonable in view of the
circumstances. Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 Atl. 648 (1929); Butler v.
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litem, representing minor remaindermen and an incompetent bene-
ficiary, filed a cross-bill in which made the present occupant of the
building a defendant for the purpose of discovery as to the occupant's
offer to re-lease the premises. The occupant answered and submitted
a lease proposal substantially similar to that of its competitor. The
court of appeals reversed a decree which ordered the trustees to
accept occupant's proposal. On certiorari, held (3-2) 2 reversed and
remanded. When property interests of minors and infants are before
the court, the chancellor stands in Zoco parentis and must consider
that which will be most beneficial for them. Nashville Trust Com-
pany v. Lebeck, 270 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1954).
With rare exceptions3 it is consistently held that a court will not
substitute its judgment for that of trustees in the normal exercise of
their discretionary powers.4 That the court would have acted differ-
ently if it had been given the discretion is not a ground for judicial
direction of the execution of the trust duties.5 The usual basis for
Topkis, 63 Atl. 646 (Del. Ch. 1906); Lindenberger v. Kentucky Title Trust Co.,
270 Ky. 579, 110 S.W.2d 301 (1937); Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Norton's
Trustee, 225 Ky. 244, 73 S.W.2d 41 (1934). See North v. Augusta Real Estate
Ass'n, 130 Me. 254, 155 Atl. 36, 38 (1931); Sweeney v. Hagerstown Trust Co.,
144 Md. 612, 125 Atl. 522, 524 (1924); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 788
(1948). But a majority of the cases deny the trustee this power and require
him to procure court sanction for a lease of this type. Hunt v. Lawton. 76 Cal.
App. 655, 245 Pac. 803 (1926); In re Hubbell Trust, 135 Iowa 637. 113 N.W. 512
(1907); Bergengren v. Aldridge, 139 Mass. 259, 29 N.E. 667 (1885); Standard
Metallic Paint Co. v. Prince Mfg. Co., 133 Pa. 474, 19 Atl. 411 (1890); In re
Caswell's Will, 197 Wis. 327, 222 N.W. 235 (1928); 4 BOGERT, op. Cit. supra §
787. The Courts have power to grant authority to make the lease when it is
shown that the benefits to the beneficiaries justify such action. Colonial Trust
Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555 (1926); Deneere v. Walker, 214 Ill.
113, 73 N.E. 409 (1905); Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263, 56 N.E. 306 (1900); In re
Hubbell Trust, supra; Upham v. Plankinton, 152 Wis. 275, 140 N.W. 5 (1913);
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 189, comments c and d (1935). As a general rule, a
lease that extends beyond the life of the trust is void on termination of the
trust if it was not approved by the court. In re Hubbell Trust, supra; 4 BOGERT,
op. cit. supra § 790; 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 189.2 (1939); Comment, 21 So. CALIF. L.
RFEV. 260 (1948); 36 MARQ. L. REV. 121 (1952). See generally, 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 189 (1939): Harriman, Leasinq of Real Property Held in Trust and the Cove-
nants of the Trustees, 3 CoN. B.J. 80 (1929); Note, 21 HARV. L. REv. 211 (1907);
Comments, 21 So. CALIF. L. REV. 260 (1948), 38 YALE L.J. 794 (1929); 7 N.C.L.
REV. 94 (1928).
2. Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Neil; concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Prewitt; dissent by Mr. Justice Tomlinson, with Mr. Justice Swepston concurr-
ing.
3. Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18 S.W.2d 859 (1929), 18 Ky. L.J. 399 (1930);
In re D'Epinoix's Settlement [1914] 1 Ch. 890, 28 HARV. L. REV. 216 (1915);
In re Hodges, 7 Ch. D. 754 (1878).
4. In re Marre's Estate, 18 Cal.2d 184, 114 P.2d 586 (1941); McCarthy v.
Tierney, 116 Conn. 588, 165 Atl. 807 (1933); Martin v. McCune, 318 Ill. 585, 149
N.E. 489 (1925); Marburg v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 177 Md. 165, 9 A.2d
222 (1939); Baer v. Kahn, 131 Md. 17, 101 Atl. 596 (1917); Dumaine v. Dumaine,
301 Mass. 214, 16 N.E.2d 625 (1938): Pritchard v. Carpenter, 212 Minn. 233, 3
N.W.2d 226 (1942); In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943), 42
Micu. L. REv. 952 (1944); Kirk v. Vohland, 135 Neb. 77, 280 N.W. 241 (1938);
Loftin v. Kenan, 276 N.Y. 615, 12 N.E.2d 604 (1938).
5. In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943); RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 187, comment e (1935); 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS 988 (1939).
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court intervention is a finding that the trustees in their actions abused
their discretion6 in acting under an improper motive,7 defeating the
intention of the settlor,8 going beyond the bounds of reasonable judg-
ment,9 committing a breach of trust,10 conducting themselves in an
unreasonable, capricious and arbitrary manner,1 or acting under a
misapprehension as to their powers and duties.1
2
In the instant case the court based its intervention not on the
ground of the trustees' misconduct, but on the principle that the
chancellor stands in Zoco parentis to children and lunatics.13 Broadly
stated, this is an equitable principle which allows the chancellor to
act for persons who, because of a disability, are unable to act for
themselves.14 These persons, it is said, become wards of the court
and the chancellor must see that their interests are protected. 5 It
has been utilized, inter alia, to allow the chancellor to correct a be-
trayal of confidence, to ratify or avoid a contract, or to convert a
ward's realty into personalty. 16 In no American case found, however,
has the minority or incompetency of the cestui que trust alone proved
grounds for the court's usurpation of the discretion of a testamentary
trustee. Evidential of the lack of precedent for such a holding are
the unauthoritative citations in the opinion in the instant case. In
addition to cases upholding the general rule of non-intervention
despite the factor of disabled beneficiaries,17 there is language in
several cases which impliedly negates the principle advanced by the
6. Rinker's Adm'r v. Simpson, 159 Va. 612, 166 S.E. 546 (1932), 81 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 1008 (1933).
7. Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 300 (1888).
8. Murphy v. Delano, 95 Me. 229, 49 Atl. 1053 (1901).
9. Stallard v. Johnson, 189 Okla. 376, 116 P.2d 965 (1941); Angell v. Angell,
28 R.I. 592, 68 Atl. 583 (1908).
10. Carter v. Young, 193 N.C. 678, 137 S.E. 875 (1927).
11. Keating v. Keating, 182 Iowa 1056, 165 N.W. 74 (1917).
12. In re Murray, 142 Me. 24, 45 A.2d 636 (1946).
13. To support its intervention the court enunciated another principle:
"When complainants brought to the Chancery Court the question of their
authority under the respective trusts, and craved its jurisdiction for specific
purposes, the court then and there had jurisdiction for all purposes." 270 S.W.2d
at 475.
Thus, in effect, it holds that when a trustee makes petition to the chancellor
for any purpose, he abdicates the discretion vested in him. Such a proposition
runs counter to the reason behind the general rule that a court will not direct
a trustee in the use of his discretionary powers; that is, the settlor placed this
discretion not in the chancellor but in the trustee, and judicial interference
with it would therefore defeat the intention of the settlor. Martin v. McCune,
318 Ill. 585, 149 N.E. 489 (1925); In re Falsey's Estate, 56 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Surr. Ct.
1945). In the latter case the trustee of a trust for an incompetent beneficiary
sought court direction as to the administration of the trust. Held, even on ap-
plication of the trustee, the court may not direct him as to matters that fall
within his discretion.
14. GIBSON'S SUITS IN CHANCERY § 35 (4th ed., Higgins and Crownover, 1937).
15. Id. § 970.
16. Ibid.; 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1303 et. seq. (5th ed., Symons,
1941); 27 Am. JuR., Infants §§ 101, 103 (1940).
17. In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1938); In re Falsey's
Estate, 56 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
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case at hand. In Wood v. Wood,'8 for example, the court, in ordering
a guardian to change investments for the benefit of the minor owners,
stated: "There being no legal trust vested in the guardian, in the
character of trustee ... this court may lawfully control the exercise
of the legal power of the guardian over the property."'19
Rather than affirmatively condoning judicial interference with the
discretion of a trustee,20 the court, by adverting to the chancellor's
power in loco parentis, supported its opinion by a principle of dubious
application to the situation presented. 21 It is regrettable that the court
in reaching such a novel decision disregarded the basic issue presented
by the appeal.
WILLS-REVOCATION BY OPERATION OF LAW-
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AS
EFFECTING IMPLIED REVOCATION
Plaintiffs, children of testator, contested probate of their father's
will which named their mother, the separated widow of the deceased,
as sole devisee. Contestants' motion for a directed verdict was granted
on the ground that the will had been revoked by a subsequent separa-
tion agreement containing a property settlement. Proponent appealed.
Held, reversed. A separation agreement coupled with a property
settlement does not amount to such a change of conditions as would
effect a revocation by operation of law. Price v. Price, 269 S.W.2d 920
(Tenn. 1954).
The character of change in conditions essential for revocation
implied by law is subject to great diversity of opinion. Modern
statutes are essentially of two types:1 (1) those in which revocation
by operation of law is limited to situations expressly enumerated 2
and (2) those which state, following an enumeration of the traditional
18. 5 Paige 596. 28 Am. Dec. 451 (N.Y. 1836).
19. Id. at 604, 28 Am. Dec. at 457. See also Brown v. Hester, 237 Ala. 321, 186
So. 695, 697 (1939).
20. In support of such principle see 28 HARV. L. REV. 216 (1914); 18 Ky. L.J.
399 (1930).
21. As stated in a dissenting opinion by Tomlinson, J.: "[T]he Court has
strayed far from the law of trust, as heretofore understood and practiced, in
going further by substituting its discretion for that of the trustees, in a matter
as to which there is a choice, and in mandamusing, in effect, these trustees to
scuttle the lease which they had made and sign the one which the majority of
this Court considers 'superior'." Instant Case at 485.
1. Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills, 14 IowA L. REV. 283 (1929).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 731.09, 731.12, 731.16, 731.18 (1941); S.C. CODE, § 19-221
(1952); S.D. CODE, § 56.0217 (1939).
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forms of revocation,3 that the enumeration shall not be construed as
preventing revocation implied by law."
In the absence, as in Tennessee, of any statutory provision relating
to revocation implied by law, and in jurisdictions having a statute
similar to type (2) above, the common law is controlling. Revocation
by operation of law resulted from only two situations at early com-
mon law.5 Birth of issue following a subsequent marriage resulted in
revocation of a man's will;0 subsequent marriage alone effected a like
result in the case of a woman's.
7
Courts today are in dispute as to just what change in circumstances
will warrant partial or complete revocation.8 Most courts, however,
do not limit the doctrine of implied revocation to the cases where the
particular facts would have been sufficient to have worked a revoca-
tion at early common law.9
The English cases do not contain any references which indicate that
a divorce, with or without a property settlement, will revoke a will,
in whole or in part. ° This situation is undoubtedly due to the infre-
quency of divorce in England until relatively modern times." Al-
though not within the letter of the common-law rule, divorce with
settlement seems clearly to be within its spirit. The changed social
and moral relations are of *such character as to justify the legal as-
sumption that the testator's failure to revoke was not intentional.
Although Tennessee 2 and the majority of American jurisdictions 3
3. By formal writing or by act on the document. See Bordwell, Statute Law
of Wills, 14 IOWA L. REv. 283, 285; 4 KxCENT'S COMM. *520 (1896).
4. MnN. STAT. ANN. § 525.19 (West Supp. 1954). NEB. REv. STAT. § 30.209
(1943).
5. Durfee, Revocation of Wills by Subsequent Changes in the Condition or
Circumstances of the Testator, 40 MIcH. L. REV. 406 (1942).
6. Shorten v. Judd, 60 Kan. 73, 55 Pac. 286 (1898); Glascott v. Bragg, 111 Wis.
605, 87 N.W. 853 (1901) (will revoked even though child was adopted).
7. Vandeveer v. Higgins, 59 Neb. 333, 80 N.W. 1043 (1899); In re Carey's
Estate, 49 Vt. 236 (1877), 24 Am. Rep. 133 (1912); See In re Kelly's Estate, 191
Minn. 280, 254 N.W. 437, 92 A.L.R. 1007 (1934).
8. In re Bartlett's Estate, 108 Neb. 681, 190 N.W. 869 (1922), 25 A.L.R. 39
(1923) (divorce and property settlement); In re McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich. 1,
199 N.W. 686 (1924), 37 A.L.R. 308 (1925) (divorce alone).
9. In re Bartlett's Estate, 108 Neb. 681, 190 N.W. 869, 25 A.L.R. 39 (1922),
declared, after holding a divorce accompanied by a property settlement suffi-
cient to revoke testator's will, that the purpose of statutory enactments ex-
pressly retaining the common law rule was to preserve and perpetuate the
underlying principle upon which those revocations were based. But cf. In re
Brown's Estate, 139 Iowa 219, 117 N.W. 260 (1908) limiting those changes suffi-
cient to imply revocation to those that would have amounted to revocation
under the common law at the time the Iowa statute was enacted.
10. ATKiNSON, WMLs 431 (2d ed. 1953); see Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16,
54 N.W. 699, 701 (1893), 35 Am. St. Rep. 545, 549 (1894).
11. ATKmSON, WiLs 431 (2d ed. 1953).
12. Rankin v. McDearman, Admr., No. 1 Gibson Equity, Sept. Sess., 1953,
Tenn. App. W.D., Dec. 2, 1953 (unpublished).
13. Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699 (1893), 35 Am. St. Rep. 545
(1894); In re Hall's Estate, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N.W. 219 (1909); In re Martin's
Estate, 109 Neb. 289, 190 N.W. 872 (1922) (regardless of intention). Contra:
In re Bartlett's Estate, 108 Neb. 681, 190 N.W. 869, 25 A.L.R. 39 (1922); Hertrais
v. Moore, 325 Mass. 57, 88 N.E.2d 909 (1949).
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have held that a divorce, accompanied by a property settlement, re-
vokes a legacy in favor of the divorced spouse, a divorce, unaccom-
panied by a property settlement, has been held not to constitute a
sufficient change.14
In the instant case the Tennessee court held that a mere separation,
though accompanied by a property settlement, was not sufficient to
imply revocation. This decision was not, however, based on any strict
adherence to the older view limiting the situation giving rise to a
presumption of revocation to those existing under common law, but
was merely recognition that testator, not having acquired a divorce,
may not yet have completely and irrevocably severed all legal and
moral ties with his spouse. It is the province of the legislature to




Testator cut off a grandson in his will, referring to him with ex-
pressions which were libelous per se. In an action for testamentary
libel against the testator's estate, the trial court sustained a demurrer
to the complaint, and plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed. Death of the
testator should not deprive plaintiff of a remedy when libelous state-
ments are made by the testator under circumstances which result in
their inevitable publication at his death. Kleinschmidt v. Matthieu,
206 P.2d 686 (Ore. 1954).
An essential element in the tort of libel is publication.' A substantial
difficulty arises when the publication occurs after the death of the
expressor, as is the situation in defamation by will.2 The courts of the
United States are split on the question of whether or not an action
for testamentary libel may be maintained against the testator's estate.3
14. Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492 (1881), 40 Am. Rep. 187 (1912); Murphy
v. Markis, 98 N.J. Eq. 153, 130 Atl. 840 (1925). But see In re McGraw's Estate,
228 Mich. 1. 199 N.W. 686, 688 (1924), 37 A.L.R. 308, 310 (1925).
1. Commonwealth v. Szliakys, 254 Mass. 424, 150 N.E. 190 (1926); Renfro
Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S.W.2d 246, 146 A.L.R. 732 (1942); 53
C.J.S., Libel and Slander § 1 (a) (1936); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568 (1934).
2. See Rubin, Defamation by Will, (1950] WASH. U.L.Q. 122; Note, 1 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 575 (1954); Note, 8 INTRA. L. REV. (N.Y.U.) 292 (1953).
3. Action denied: Citizens and Southern Nat'l Bank v. Hendricks, 176 G-.
692, 168 S.E. 313, 87 A.L.R. 230 (1933); Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48
S.E.2d 814 (1948). Action allowed: Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.2d
910 (Sup. Ct. 1945); In re Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1901); Harris v.
Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584, 49 L.R.A. (N.s.) 897 (1914).
No American case has held an executor personally liable for his publication,
as it is his legal duty to probate the will. See Note, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 575, 577
(1954). In Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945) it was




The primary obstacle to consistent reasoning by the courts is the
fact that in a case of testamentary libel, unlike other tort suits, the
cause of action does not accrue until the tortfeasor is dead. At common
law, the causes of action for personal torts did not survive the death
of the wrongdoer, in accord with the maxim actio personalis
moritur cum persona-a personal action dies with the person.4 Statutes
specifying the causes of action which survive usually do not include
libel and slander. 5 It may be felt by the legislatures that the social
advantage in allowing litigation involving issues of morality is ques-
tionable where one of the parties is dead."
The courts which refuse to sanction the action for testamentary
libel advance several arguments. One theory is that since the testator
is dead, and hence incapable of any act of publication, he cannot com-
mit the tort of libel;7 but this theory appears to be merely an after-
thought and was not determinative in the one case in which it was
employed. Another argument is that the rule which makes the plead-
ings in a judicial proceeding privileged ought to apply to wills; s but
in the leading case in support of this proposition, the court seems to
express doubt as to whether the privilege extends so far as to shield
a testator who acts primarily from malice, rather than from a desire
to control the distribution of his property.9 A third argument'( is
based on the purported necessity for a strict adherence to the common-
law maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona. This view ignores
the fact that the cause of action was not in existence prior to the death
of the testator." Those courts denying relief for testamentary libel
have thus indulged in some rather questionable theorizing in order to
reach a result which seems to spring from a fear that a departure from
the common-law tradition that a personal cause of action dies with
the defendant could not be confined to actions for testamentary libel.'2
On the other hand, those courts allowing the action engage in equally
doubtful reasoning in order to afford the plaintiff a remedy. In a
Tennessee case13 it was said that the executor acted as an agent of
4. PROSSER, TORTS 949 (1941); 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival § 115 (1936).
5. NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL, 363-64 (4th ed., 1924); 1 AM.
JuR., Abatement and Revival § 122 (1936).
6. Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims for
and against Executors and Administrators, 29 M1xc. L. REv. 969, 987 (1931).
7. See Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168
S.E. 313, 315, 87 A.L.R. 230, 234 (1933).
8. Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 Atl. 487 (1934).
9. Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 Atl. 487, 488-89 (1934).
10. Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E.
313, 87 A.L.R. 230 (1933); Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948).
11. See Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584, 49 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 897 (1914). See also Instant Case at 687.
12. See Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814, 818 (1948); Note, 87
A.L.R. 234 (1933).
13. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 578, 162 S.W. 584, 585, 49
L.R.A. (N.s.) 897, 898 (1914). But see Instant Case at 688.
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the testator in the publication of the libel, thus rendering the testator's
estate liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Here the court
ignores established principles of agency.14 A second argument in favor
of allowing the action is to the effect that the testator set in motion a
chain of events calculated to lead to the inevitable publication of the
libelous matter, thus completing the tort during the testator's lifetime.10 5
Such a view, however, fails to take into consideration the doctrine of
actio personalis moritur cum persona, which would still cut off liabil-
ity.
The logical manner of treating the problem would seem to be to cast
theory aside and to allow the action as a matter of general policy 0
which should afford the innocent person protection against the malice
of the deceased tortfeasor.17 Although no court has, as yet, been so
frank, there are indications in several opinions that there may be a
trend in this direction.' Several courts have implied their suscepti-
bility to such influencing factors as the deliberation involved in the
expression of the libel 0 and the permanency of the publication.20
The instant case more closely approaches frank reliance on the policy
argument than does any previous case.
14. "Upon the death of the principal, his former agent has no authority to
act for the principal's estate even though the authority was given in contem-
plation of the principal's death .... It is only where a power, although in the
form of an agency power, is given for the benefit of the agent or a third per-
son, that the power is not terminated by the death of the one giving it .. .
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 120, comment a (1933).
15. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
16. Cases involving other types of torts in which the cause of action arises
subsequent to the death of the tortfeasor are virtually non-existent. There are,
however, at least two cases which consider the problem indirectly. In Maloney
v. Victor, 175 Misc. 258, 25 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (Sup. Ct. 1940), it was said that
under a survival statute the plaintiff could maintain an action for damages
resulting from a collision caused by the negligence of the decedent, even though
the cause of action should not have arisen until after the death of the decedent.
But it was held in the cited case that the cause of action did accrue prior to the
death of the tortfeasor. In U.S. Casualty Co. v. Rice, 18 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929), it was held that there was no cause of action for injury in an
automobile collision by virtue of the survival statute where the injury was
caused by the negligence of a person deceased at the time the injury was
received.
17. PROssER, TORTS 813 (1941).
18. "He composed the alleged libel and in justice his estate should bear the
burden of defending it." Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.2d 910, 917
(Sup. Ct. 1945). See also Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 585, 162
S.W. 584, 587, 49 L.R.A. (N.s.) 897, 902 (1914).
19. "It was written in cold blood in contemplation of publication at a time
when no action could be brought against the person of the wrongdoer .... "
In re Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733, 736-37 (1901).
20. "No more effective means of publishing and perpetuating a libel can be
conceived than to secure the inscription of such matters on court records, as
by probate of a will." Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 578, 162
S.W. 584, 585, 49 L.R.A. (N.s.) 897, 900 (1914). See also In re Gallagher's Estate,





Plaintiff, employed by defendant county highway department as a
rock crusher, became incapacitated for work by an attack of pneu-
monia. During convalescence, his personal physician and the state
health department determined that he was suffering from pneumoco-
niosis, a disease which is not compensable under the Tennessee Work-
men's Compensation Law. Subsequently, when plaintiff became per-
manently and totally disabled, the health department diagnosed his
illness as silicosis, an occupational disease under the Tennessee sched-
ule. Plaintiff's claim, which was filed immediately thereafter, was
rejected by the trial court on the ground that claimant had suffered
from silicosis, notwithstanding lack of diagnosis as such, for more than
a year before bringing suit and that his cause of action was barred by
the statute of limitations;1 plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed and re-
manded. The statute will not begin to run until the claimant has actual
or constructive knowledge that his disability is due to a compensable
disease. Wilson v. Van Buren County, 268 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1954).
The Tennessee court reasoned that it could not have been the in-
tent of the legislature to require the claimant to file a claim for a
disability from a disease that he did not know existed or which did
not in fact exist.2 The court had previously held that "incapacity for
work" under the statute3 did not mean the time that the injury com-
menced.4 In view of this holding and the statutory provision that an
occupational disease is one that can be diagnosed as such,5 the court
concluded that "incapacity for work" and the claimant's actual or con-
structive knowledge that the occupational disease is the cause must
concur before the claim period begins to run.6
Considering the remedial nature of workmen's compensation legisla-
tion, which requires that the facts of a given claim be construed in
the light most favorable to the claimant, 7 the Tennessee court has
reached a result which finds general support in most jurisdictions
1. The failure to give written notice was excused by the court under author-
ity granted to them by the statute. TENN. CoDE AxN. § 6872 (Williams Supp.
1952).
2. See Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909, 911
(1947).
3. "The right to compensation for occupational disease shall be forever
barred unless suit therefor is commenced within one year after the beginning
of incapacity for work resulting from an occupational disease." TENN. CODE
Awx. § 6852(d) (Williams Supp. 1952).
4. Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Wilkins, 194 Tenn. 683, 254 S.W.2d 973 (1953).
5. "An employee has an occupational disease within the meaning of this law
if the disease or condition has developed to such extent that it can be diagnosed
as an occupational disease." TENN. CODE ANN. § 6852(d) (Williams Supp. 1952).
6. Instant Case at 367.
7. See Johnson Coffee Co. v. McDonald, 143 Tenn. 505, 514, 226 S.W. 215, 217




which, either by statute or judicial construction, date their limitation
periods from the "injury," the "disability," the "incapacity for work,"
or the "first distinct manifestation of the disease. 8
The same problems of construction arise in occupational disease
cases as in the cases of all slowly developing injuriesY The general
rule may be stated that the statute of limitations for occupational
disease runs from the time a reasonable claimant should know that
his disability resulted from such a disease.1 °
Some statutes circumscribe the freedom of the courts to determine
the time of accrual of a cause of action by dating the limitation period
for filing claims in disease cases from the "last injurious exposure"'"
or imposing an overall limitation on any claim dating from the "acci-
dent"12 or "last day of work."'1 3 In the face of an overall limitation
provision, one court which followed the majority view in previous
cases14 said, in dictum in a case not involving a disease, that it was
now an open question as to when the statute begins to run in occupa-
tional disease cases.15 Some states, by judicial construction, have
ignored or disregarded the "knowledge" requirement of the majority
view and have held that, in disease cases, the statute runs from the
8. Great American Indemnity Co. v. Britton, 179 F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(injury diagnosed after one-year period expired); Kropp v. Parker, 8 F.Supp.
290 (D. Md. 1934) (latent injury); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 43 Ariz. 50, 29 P.2d 142 (1934) (injury resulting in cyst); Pacific
Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 205 P.2d 742 (Cal. App. 1949), re-
versed, 34 Cal.2d 726, 214 P.2d 530 (1950) (disease); Pullman Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 164 P.2d 955 (Cal. App. 1945), af'd, 28 Cal.2d 379, 170 P.2d 10
(1946) (disease); Marsh v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933,
86 A.L.R. 563 (1933) (disease); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
271 P.2d 149 (Cal. App. 1954) (disease); Bremner v. Marc Eidlitz & Son, 118
Conn. 666, 174 Atl. 172 (1934) (disease); Free v. Associated Indemnity Corp.,
78 Ga. App. 839, 52 S.E.2d 325 (1949) (silicosis); Consolidated Coal Co. v.
Porter, 192 Md. 494, 64 A.2d 715 (1949) (silicosis); Bergeron's Case, 243 Mass.
366, 137 N.E. 739 (1923) (lead poisoning); Finch v. Ford Motor Co., 321 Mich.
469, 32 N.W.2d 712 (1948) (pneumoconiosis); Ford v. American Brake Shoe
Co., 252 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. App. 1952) (silicosis); Gleason v. Titanium Pigment
Co., 93 S.W.2d 1039 (Mo. App. 1936) (sewer gas); Dryden v. Omaha Steel
Works, 148 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.2d 293 (1947) (accident aggravating dormant dis-
ease); Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873 (1944)
(latent injury); Blassingame v. Southern Asbestos Co., 217 N.C. 223, 7 S.E.2d
478 (1940) (asbestosis) ; Larkin v. George A. Fuller Co., 76 R.I. 395, 71 A.2d 690
(1950) (latent injury); Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531 (1936),
108 A.L.R. 304 (1937) (latent injury).
9. See 2 LARSON, WoRucvrEN's COMPENSATION LAW § 78.52 (1952).
10. See generally Note, 11 A.L.R.2d 298 (1950).
11. Rowe v. Gatke Corp., 126 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1942); American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Hayden, 285 Ky. 684, 149 S.W.2d 6 (1941); Texti-
leather Corp. v. Great American Indemnity Co., 108 N.J.L. 121, 156 Atl. 840 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1931); Richardson v. State Comp. Comm'r, 74 S.E.2d 258 (W. Va.
1953).
12. Morgan v. Rust Engineering Co., 52 So.2d 86 (La. App. 1951).
13. Andrzeczak v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 12, 20 N.W.2d 551 (1945).
14. Trustees, Middle River Sanatorium v. Industrial Comm'n, 224 Wis. 536,
272 N.W. 483 (1937).
15. Andrzeczak v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 12, 20 N.W.2d 551 (1945).
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date of the "accident as a sudden occurrence,"16 "disability from the
disease,"' "disability from earning wages in the same employ,"'18
"the time the disease is apparent,"'1 and from the time "when a reason-
able man would know he needed a doctor's help.
'20
The confusion as to when the limitation period begins to run in
occupational disease cases results from the ambiguous language of the
workmen's compensation and occupational disease acts. The proper
remedy lies in legislation. With the exception of states whose statutes
date the period from the "last injurious exposure" or "last day of
work," however, there is apparently no statutory inhibition to the
achievement by judicial construction of the equitable result reached
under the majority view. For those who view such a liberal exercise
of judicial construction with trepidation lest an undeserving claimant
be awarded compensation, it is sufficient to say that each claimant still
must prove his claim.21
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUS OF CORPORATE
EXECUTIVE-DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE OR
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL TEST
The president of a mining corporation was killed while driving to
a convention' to represent the corporation in an executive capacity.
The officer had accepted workmen's compensation coverage by signing
the company register, and had been included in the company's compen-
sation insurance policy for almost twenty years. The Workmen's
Compensation Board denied compensation to the widow; on review
the circuit court ruled that a corporate president was an employee and
death was compensable. Held, affirmed.2 A corporate executive need
not, at the time of injury, be performing work ordinarily done by a
laborer to be considered an "employee" within the meaning of the
Act. Mine Service Co. v. Green, 265 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1954).
16. Birmingham Electric Co. v. Meacham, 27 Ala. App. 471, 175 So. 316, cert.
denied, 234 Ala. 506, 175 So. 322 (1937); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Cham-
bers, 233 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
17. State ex rel. Raymond v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 233, 42 N.E.2d
992 (1942).
18. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 401 Inl. 382, 82 N.E.2d
449 (1948).
19. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. State Ind. Comm., 200 Okla. 281, 192 P.2d
1015 (1948).
20. Salyer v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 191 Va. 331, 61 S.E.2d 16 (1950).
21. See 2 LARsow, WoRKmVEN's COMPENsATIoN LAW § 78.42(c) (1952).
1. When in the performance of his duties an employee is required to travel,
and an accident occurs while he is so engaged, normally it arises out of and in
the course of his employment and within the scope of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d 212
(1949). See Coster v. Thompson Hotel Co., 102 Neb. 585, 168 N.W. 191 (1918).
2. Opinion by Moremen, J.; dissent by Sims, C. J., Stewart, J., concurring.
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Early in the history of the Workmen's Compensation Acts the courts
emphasized that the purpose of workmen's compensation, as indicated
by the short title of the acts and the limitations thereof to employers
employing workmen, was to provide financial protection to workmen
and their dependents and not to protect corporate officials.3 Soon,
however, the courts began to qualify this view. While it was considered
that officers of large corporations could not be regarded as employees
since their duties are strictly executive, it was conceded that in small
corporations it might be necessary for executives also to perform a
workman's duties.4 This was the beginning of the "dual capacity"
doctrine, under which executive officers of a corporation will not be
denied compensation merely because they are executive officers if, at
the time of the injury, they are engaged in performing manual labor
or the ordinary duties of a workman. 5 While the doctrine originated
as an aid to the courts in determining who could be considered an
"employee," its theory is found in Workmen's Compensation Acts
defining "employee."6 Today the theory is adhered to in the majority
of decided cases. 7
The dual capacity doctrine is rejected in the instant case as an "arti-
ficial distinction," and the court looks to the words of the Act to deter-
mine legislative intents as to who should be classed as employer and
employeeY It interprets the intention of the Act to be the inclusion of
all employees. The fact that a person is not acting as an employee in
the sense of a workman 0 does not preclude his being considered an
employee; the fact that he is employed by someone,1 an entity,'12 gives
3. Bowne v. S. W. Bowne Co., 221 N.Y. 28, 116 N.E. 364 (1917).
4. In re Raynes, 66 Ind. App. 321, 118 N.E. 387 (1917).
5. 71 C.J., Workmen's Compensation Acts § 238 (1935).
6. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. AwN. art. 8309 (1925); S.D. Code § 31.3320 (1939).
7. See Grossman v. Industrial Comm'n, 376 Ill. 198, 33 N.E.2d 444 (1941);
Mount Pleasant Mining Corp. v. Vermeulen, 117 Ind. App. 33, 65 N.E.2d 642
(1946); White v. Arnold Wood Heel Co., 90 N.H. 315, 8 A.2d 737 (1939); Brown
v. Conway Electric Light & Power Co., 82 N.H. 78, 129 Atl. 633 (1925); Gassa-
way v. Gassaway & Owen, Inc., 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120 (1942); Hillenbrand
v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Ohio App. 427, 52 N.E.2d 547 (1943); Lichty v. Lichty
Const. Co., 69 Wyo. 411, 243 P.2d 151 (1952). See also 58 Am. Jur., Workmen's
Compensation § 150 (1948).
8. Palmer v. Van Santvoord, 153 N.Y. 612, 47 N.E. 915 (1897), 38 L.R.A. 402
(1898).
9. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.003 (1) (Baldwin Supp. 1953): "Employer shall
mean and include individuals, partnerships, voluntary associations, and private
corporations." "Employee" is not defined in the Act.
10. Cf. Brook's, Inc. v. Claywell, 215 Ark. 913, 224 S.W.2d 37 (1949) (presi-
dent of five-man corporation counted as employee in order to bring corpora-
tion within Compensation Act). Contra: Grossman v. Industrial Comm'n, 376
Ill. 198, 33 N.E.2d 444 (1941); Higgins v. Bates Street Shirt Co., 129 Me. 6,
149 Atl. 147 (1930); Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d
212 (1949); Brown v. Conway Electric Light & Power Co., 82 N.H. 78, 129 Atl.
633 (1925); Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owen, Inc., 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120
(1942). See Note 15 A.L.R. 1288 (1921).
11. "The Workmen's Compensation Act contemplates that an employee must
have an employer." Leigh Aitchison, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Wis. 218,
205 N.W. 806, 808 (1925).
12. "A corporation is a complete entity separate and distinguishable from its
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him employee status.'13 In determining the decedent's status under the
Act, the court utilized the control and supervision test14 by which
susceptibility to control and supervision is evidence of the employer-
employee relationship. 5 By recognizing the corporate entity, 6 the
court finds a control"' to which the executive is responsible. 8 By the
majority rule a stockholder,19 officer or director of a corporation is
not precluded from being at the same time an employee.2 0 The Ken-
tucky court, however, is apparently the first to say, in the absence of
an express statute,21 that an officer can be considered an employee
stockholders and officers." Skoutchi v. Chic Cloak and Suit Co., 230 N.Y. 296,
130 N.E. 299, 300 (1919). See Dewey v. Dewey Fuel Co., 210 Mich. 370, 178 N.W.
36 (1920); Solheim v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d 212, 219
(1949); Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 748
(1931).
13. Since a partnership is not considered, for most purposes, an entity separate
from its members, partners are held not to be employees under the Compensa-
tion Act, unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. Rasmussen v. Trico
Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947); Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co.,
[1905] 1 K.B. 324. See 1 LARSoN, WoRamEN's COmPENSATiON LAW § 54.31-54.32
(1952).
14. 25 NOTRE DAME LAW. 586 (1950).
15. Donaldson v. William H.B. Donaldson Co., 176 Minn. 422, 223 N.W. 772
(1929); Millers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hoover, 216 S.W. 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919),
af'd 235 S.W. 863 (1921); see Leigh Aitchison, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 188
Wis. 218, 205 N.W. 806 (1925); see also Hunter v. Hunter Auto Co., 204 N.C.
723, 169 S.E. 648 (1933), where the court applies both dual capacity, and con-
trol and supervision tests.
16. Emery's Case, 271 Mass. 46, 170 N.E. 839 (1930); Star Brewing Co. v.
Flynn, 237 Mass. 213, 129 N.E. 438 (1921); McAlevey v. Litch, 234 Mass. 440,
125 N.E. 606 (1920).
17. Instant Case, at 946: '"Mx. Green, although acting in a position of superior
authority, was nevertheless subject to the superior will and direction of the
corporate employer, which had the power to remove him by proper action."
18. But cf. Bendix v. Bendix Co., 217 Minn. 439, 14 N.W.2d 464 (1944); Bowne
v. S.W. Bowne Co., 221 N.Y. 28, 116 N.E. 364 (1917); Leigh Aitchison, Inc. v.-
Industrial Comm'n, 188 Wis. 218, 205 N.W. 806 (1925). When the officer's posi-
tion is such that he is in complete control of the corporation and is thus in
effect working for himself, he is not regarded as an employee.,
19. See Claude H. Wolfe, Inc. v. Wolfe, 154 Fla. 633, 18 So.2d 535 (1944);
White v. Arnold Wood Heel Co., 90 N.H. 315, 8 A.2d 737 (1939); Beckman v.
Oelerich, 174 App. Div. 353, 160 N.Y. Supp. 791 (3d Dep't 1917); Southern
Surety Co. v. Childers, 87 Okla. 261, 209 Pac. 927 (1922). Contra: Donaldson v.
William H.B. Donaldson Co., 176 Minn. 422, 223 N.W. 772 (1929); Kolpien v.
O'Donnell Lumber Co., 230 N.Y. 301, 130 N.E. 301 (1921); Bowne v. S.W. Bowne
Co., 221 N.Y. 28, 116 N.E. 364 (1917); Leigh Aitchison, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 188 Wis. 218, 205 N.W. 806 (1925).
20. See Claude H. Wolfe, Inc. v. Wolfe, 154 Fla. 633, 18 So.2d 535 (1944);
Stevens v. Industrial Comm'n, 346 Ill. 495, 179 N.E. 102 (1931); Mount Pleasant
Mining Corp. v. Vermeulen, 117 Ind. App. 33, 65 N.E.2d 642 (1946); In re
Raynes, 66 Ind. App. 321, 118 N.E. 387 (1917); Dewey v. Dewey Fuel Co., 210
Mich. 370, 178 N.W. 36 (1920); Delaney v. Dan Delaney, Inc., 227 Minn. 572,
36 N.W.2d 12 (1949); Hubbs v. Addison Electric Light & P. Co., 230 N.Y. 303,
130 N.E. 302 (1921); Skoutchi v. Chic Cloak and Suit Co., 230 N.Y. 296, 130
N.E. 299 (1919); Beckman v. Oelerich, 174 App. Div. 353, 160 N.Y. Supp. 791 (3d
Dep't 1917); Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owen, Inc., 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120
(1942); Southern Surety Co. v. Childers, 87 Okla. 261, 209 Pac. 927 (1922);
Eagleson v. Harry G. Preston Co., 265 Pa. 397, 109 At. 154 (1919); Leigh
Aitchison, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Wis. 281, 205 N.W. 806 (1925).
21. Iowa excepts "a person holding an official position, or standing in a
representative capacity of the employer." IOWA CODE Arx. § 5.61 (3c) (1947).
California expressly includes corporate officers. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 3351
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when he performs only executive duties.22
The court refers to the inclusion of the president in the corporation's
compensation insurance policy. Evidence that insurance premiums
have or have not been paid for an executive claiming under the Work-
men's Compensation Act has been given different weight by different
courts. 23 In cases involving the Standard Workmen's Compensation
and Employers' Liability Policy,24 some courts have allowed recovery
on the basis of the voluntary liability assumed under the policy 25 and
not on the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act.20 Therefore, if
the Kentucky court is looking to the words of the Act in arriving at its
decision, the insurance provisions and premium payments should not
be controlling, as the policy does not create legal liability under the
Act.
Is the court's interpretation of who should be considered an employee
under the Workmen's Compensation Act too broad? It is, according to
(Supp. 1953). New York expressly covers corporate executives unless they
elect to the contrary. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 54 (6).
22. See White v. Arnold Wood Heel Co., 90 N.H. 315, 8 A.2d 737 (1939);
Southern Surety Co. v. Childers, 87 Okla. 261, 209 Pac. 927 (1922).
23. Grossman v. Industrial Comm'n, 376 Ill. 198, 33 N.E.2d 444 (1941) (inclu-
sion of claimant's salary in premium paid by the corporation admissible as an
indication that the employer intended such person should be considered an
employee); Macshir Co. v. McFarland, 99 Ind. App. 196, 190 N.E. 69 (1934)
(fact that claimant's wages received for traveling salesman duties were in-
cluded in computing insurance did not give him right to recover for injuries
received while acting in executive capacity); Holycross & Nye, Inc. v. Nye, 97
Ind. App. 372, 186 N.E. 915 (1933) (fact that company had not used wages of
claimant vice president in computation of premiums was a determining factor
in refusing recovery); Emery's Case, 271 Mass. 46, 170 N.E. 839 (1930) (fact
that no remuneration for treasurer as workman was included in insurance
policy held not to defeat recovery for injury received while performing work-
man's services; Cashman's Case, 230 Mass. 600, 120 N.E. 78 (1918) (executive
was excluded from policy because his remuneration was not considered in
determining premium); Kuehnl v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.
313, 25 N.E.2d 682 (1940) (payment of premiums to the insurance company
destroyed any right which claimant had to recover his loss from the corpora-
tion); Southern Surety Co. v. Childers, 87 Okla. 261, 209 Pac. 927 (1922) (cor-
poration treating claimant as an employee for purposes of collection of pre-
miums, estopped to deny that he was an employee).
24. Par. 5 of the Standard Workmen's Compensation and Employers' Liability
Policy, written by all carriers in all states permitting private insurance except
Colorado, allows recovery to executive officers under a provision that the policy
shall apply to injuries sustained by persons whose remuneration is included in
computation of premiums "and, also" to injuries sustained by a corporate offi-
cer; the remuneration of such officer not to be subject to premium charge
unless he is performing duties of a superintendent, foreman or workman.
Recovery by an executive performing only executive duties is allowed by
interpreting the provision, that remuneration will be included in premium
computation only if he is performing duties of a dual capacity nature, not to be
a limitation on executive recovery, but an extension of the scope of the insur-
ance. See RIESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION, 381-87 (1950).
(1950).
25. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Boston v. Duesenberg, 214 Ind. 488, 14
N.E.2d 919 (1938), rehearing denied 16 N.E.2d 698 (1938); Sindelar v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 161 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1947). See HOBBS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION INSURANCE 406 (1939).
26. Duesenberg v. Duesenberg, Inc., 98 Ind. App. 640, 187 N.E. 750 (1933).
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the majority of decisions.27 Administration costs of workmen's com-
pensation, to be borne by the taxpayer, will be increased if executives
are included within the acts. The low-income worker for whose finan-
cial protection the act was originated, will be burdened by having to
pay, through increased consumer costs, for protection of high-salaried
executives who may not require it. The holding seems very reasonable,
however, when viewed in the light of the trend of the majority of
state courts28 to interpret Workmen's Compensation Acts liberally29
"to make industrial disabilities, so far as they are truly attributable to
the industry, a part of the cost of production."30 Executives, industry
and the public will benefit. Executives and dependents will be pro-
tected should corporate resources become impaired. Finally, corpora-
tions, particularly small corporations, who face the serious problem of
large jury awards in cases involving corporate liability, will be able
to insulate both stockholders and the public by shifting the liability
for compensation payments to the insurance carrier.
27. Benson v. Hygienic Artificial Ice Co., 198 Minn. 250, 269 N.W. 460 (1936)
(officer who performed no services other than in his executive capacity, held
not an employee) ; Higgins v. Bates Street Shirt Co., 129 Me. 6, 149 Atl. 147 (1930)
(president held no employee when injured in fall while returning to the com-
pany factory after a visit in his executive capacity to the offices of corpora-
tion's attorneys and auditors); Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owen, Inc., 220 N.C.
694, 18 S.E.2d 120 (1924) (corporation president held no employee when killed
in auto accident while on his way to negotiate a contract in his executive
capacity); Carville v. A. F. Bornot & Co., 288 Pa. 104, 135 Atl. 652 (1927) (vice
president killed by an explosion while telephoning and investigating with the
president a naphtha leak at the plant, held not a "servant"); Hodges v. Home
Mortgage Co., 201 N.C. 701, 161 S.E. 220, 223 (1931) (death of executive vice-
president killed in automobile accident while on his way to negotiate trust
contracts, held not compensable-duty not within field of duties of ordinary
employee).
28. See Hillenbrand v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Ohio App. 427, 52 N.E.2d 547
(1943). See also Cate, Workmen's Compensation, 6 VAND. L. REv. 1012 (1953);
7 IND. & LABOR REL. REV. 43 (1953).
29. Carter and Patterson, Workmen's Compensation in Kentucky, 41 Ky. L. J.
414 (1953).
30. Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464, 465 (2d Cir. 1939) (opinion
by Learned Hand). See also Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their
Theory and Their Constitutionality, 25 HFARv. L. Rnv. 129 (1911).
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